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~ndex Theory: The Law, Promise and Failure of 
Financial Indices 
Gabriel Rauterberg and Andrew Versteint 
Financial indices, like the S&P 500 or the Consumer Price Index, have 
become a ubiquitous feature of our financial markets. One index, the London 
InterBank Offered Rate ("Libor"), may be the world's most important number, 
an interest rate benchmark upon which hundreds of trillions of dollars depend. 
Yet, almost eve1y day new revelations emerge that Libor was tampered with 
during the height of the financial crisis by one or many of the world's most 
prominent banks, with billions of dollars potentially misappropriated. This 
index disruption has attracted tremendous interest from regulators, private 
litigants, and market observers. Despite their importance, however, financial 
indices are poorly understood, and almost completely unstudied. In this Article, 
we explain why and how people use financial indices as well as how they are 
created. We show human discretion and value judgment to be essential 
ingredients in even the most "objective" indices. We then develop a taxonomy 
of financial indices, illustrating how the risks indices can pose, and the 
solutions applicable to those risks, are intimately related to the motivation that 
drives the index's creation. We show that the manipulation of indices is 
unsurprising given the precarious state of intellectual property rights in 
indices. While many call for prosecuting or regulating the Libor banks, our 
novel solution is to strengthen property rights for those who create financial 
indices. 
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Introduction 
Libor has been called "the world 's most important number."1 It is " the 
dominant global benchmark for interest rates"2 and represents the cost of 
I. LIB OR: The World's Most Important Number, MONEY WEEK, Oct. I 0, 2008, http://www. 
moneywe~k.com/personal-finance/libor-the-worlds-most-important-number- 1 3816; see also Donald 
~acKenzte, What's !n a Number? , LONDON REv. BOOKS, Sept. 27, 2008, at II (describing Libor's 
tmportance); cf Carnck Mollenkamp, Libor Fog: Bankers Cast Doubt on Key Rate Amid Crisis, WALL 
ST. J ·• :'-~r. 16, 2008, at A I, http://online. wsj .com/article/SB 121 200703762027 135.html (reporting that 
$500 tnllton 111 contracts are indexed to Libor). 
D 2. MacKenzie, supra note I, at II ; cf Carrick Mollenkamp & Mark Whitehouse, Study Casts 
oubJ on Key Rate, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2008, at A I, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB 121200703762027 l35.html (explaining that Libor "plays a vital role in the global economy"). 
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money for hundreds of millions of people and hundreds of trillions of dollars, 
from high finance to homeowners. Over $3 60 trillion is indexed to Libor3 -the 
London InterBank Offered Rate4- or about $50,000 per human being. Libor is 
,;the language of the large capital markets,''5 dominating the interest-rate swap 
markets,6 syndicated loans,7 and powerfully influencing residential and 
commercial mortgages. 8 And in the worst hours of the financial crisis, some of 
Libor's makers set out to manipulate it. 
In recent months, dozens of bank employees have lost their jobs for 
attempting to manipulate Libor,9 including top executives at major investment 
banks.10 Most prominently, Barclays Pic recently disclosed a litany of abuses 
by its traders and paid $450 million to settle some of US and UK regulators ' 
allegations. 11 Japanese regulators have imposed penalties for attempted 
manipulation of the Tibor, Tokyo's Libor equivalent, 12 and several banks have 
admitted their traders' involvement in a rate-fixing scheme to authorities. 13 All 
. 14 . 1. 1s I . 'ff:, I 16 d I t 11 h at once, economists, JOUrna tsts, p amtJ s awyers, an regu a ors ave 
turned to ask whether Libor was successfully manipulated and how. 
3. Global Financial Stability Report: Financial Stress and Deleveraging - Macrofinancial 
Implications and Policy, INT'L MONETARY FUND, at xv (Oct. 2008), http:l/www.imf.org/extema l/ 
pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/02/pdf/text.pdf; Dennis Kuo, David Skeie & James Vickery, A Comparison of Libor 
to Other Measures of Bank Borrowing Costs I (June 2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www. newyorkfed.org/research/economists/vickery/LiborKS V _staff_ webpage.pdf. 
4 . The Basics, BBA LIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/the-basics (last 
visited Feb. 27, 20 12). 
5. Mike Carsella, Libor: Immensely Important-Little Understood, SECURED LENDER, 
July/August 2009, at 47, 48, http: //www.thesecuredlender-digital.com/thesecuredlender/20090708/ 
?pg=49. 
6. Kuo et al., supra note 3. 
7. Xanthe Lok, Libor and Market Dismption: The Future of Libor, 23 BUTTERWORTHS J. 
lNT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 421, 42 1 (2008). 
8. Justin T. Wong, Libor Left i11 Limbo; A Call for More Reform, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. J. 
365, 365 (2009) (reporting that Libor is the reference rate for $900 billion in subprime mortgages); 
Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Libor 's Rise May Sock Many Borrowers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2008, at B I , 
http://online.wsj .com/article/SB 1208561 08868827857.btml; Kuo et al., supra note 3. 
9. Richard Pullin, Traders Fired, Suspended Over LIBOR Probe: FT, REUTERS (Feb. 8, 2012, 
9:32 PM), http ://www .reuters.com/article/20 12/02/09/us-investigation-interbank-lending-
idUSTRE81807 L20 120209; UBS Fires Traders and Managers Over Libor- Report, WA LL ST. J. (Aug. 
5, 2012, I I :32 AM), http://onl ine.wsj.com/at1icle/BT-C0-20 120805-700657.html. 
10. Sara Schaefer Muiloz & Max Colchester, Top Officials at Bm·clays Resign Over Rate 
Scandal, WALL Sr. J. (July 4, 2012,8:22 AM), http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB I 000 142405270230429970457750397 4000425002.html. 
II. Steve Slater, Barclays Sets Oul Defense on Libor Fixing, REUTERS (July 3, 20 12, 6:2 1 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/20 12/07/03/us-barclays-defence-idUSBRE862 1 C020 120703. 
12. Atsuko Fukase, Update: Japan's Financial Regulators Sanction Citi Japan for 3rd Time in 
Seven Years, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 20 11, 6:34AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-C0-201 112 16-
704569.html. 
13. Jean Eaglesham, Paul Vieira & David Enrich, Traders Manipulated Key Rate, Bank Says, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2012, at Cl, http: //online.wsj .com/at1icle/SBIOOOI4240529702 
04059804577227452963906044.html. 
14. See, e.g., Connan Snider & Thomas Youle, Does the LIBOR Reflect Banks' Borrowing 
Costs? (Apr. 2, 20 1 0) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract= 1569603. 
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These revelations are surprising to many who assume that Libor is based 
on observable market data and is incapable of manipulation. Few realize that 
Libor is published by a consortium of Libor's biggest users, the Briti sh 
Bankers' Association. It uses banks' proprietary data and is highly 
discretionary due to its reliance on subjective judgment. In the end, Libor is 
calculated and set every day by the judgment of one man, John Ewan, a 
financial-services professional in his mid-thirties.
18 
Despite its importance, its 
susceptibility to influence, and allegations of its manipulation, Libor remains 
essentially unregulated. 
The effects of index manipulation could be vast. Back-of-the-envelope 
estimates suggest that fraudulent interest rates could have generated billions of 
dollars in illicit profits for the scheme' s perpetrators19 and transferred more 
than a trillion dollars from the scheme's victims.20 One study found that if the 
6-month Libor hovered 1.75% higher than historical averages, as it did in early 
2008, then the average subprime borrower would pay an additional $ 100 per 
month per $100,000 of home equity.21 Thus a modest manipulation upward in 
Libor could easily extract $ 1000 to $2000 per year from a typical subprime 
borrower. Regressive by any standard, this would increase mortgage defaults at 
a time when they a lready pose systemic risk concerns. The story is little better 
if Libor ends up too low: "A lower Libor induces a lower mortgage rate, makes 
it easier to buy homes, substituting homes away for other goods. This 
artificially inflates the prices of homes ... hav[ing] the potential to lead to 
bubbles and meltdowns of the type we are cunently experiencing."22 Most 
importantly, regardless of who w ins or loses in a particular manipulation, faulty 
Libor quotes undermine the integrity and efficiency of the world's borrowing 
markets. 
On the one hand, Libor is unique. Its importance is arguably greater than 
any other product, firm, or even industry, and its manipulation is front-page 
news. On the other hand, Libor is just one of many fmancial indices, all of 
15. See, e.g., Gillian Tett, Bank Lending Probe Lights Up Dark Financial Corners, FIN. 
TIMES, Feb. 9, 20 12, at 20, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3d447b98-533e-llcl-aafd-
OO l44feabdcO.html. 
16. See In re Libor-Based Fin. Instruments Antitmst Litig., No. I: 11-md-02262, 20 II WL 
5980198 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 20 11) (In re Libor). 
17. Carrick Mollenkamp, Exclusive: U.S. Conducting Criminal Libor Probe, REUTERS (Feb. 
29, 2012, ll :24 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/20 12/02/29/us-libor-probe-
idUSTRE8lRIZG201 20229. 
18. Interview with John Ewan, Managing Director, BBA Libor (June 15, 2011 ). 
19. Tom Osborn, Is Libor in Its Death Throes?, FIN. NEWS (Oct. 3 1, 201 1), 
http://www .efinancialnews.com/story/20 ll-1 0-31 /libor-death-throes. 
20. Libor Penalty, FIN. TIMES LEXICON (Feb. 10, 2012, 8:02 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/3/0 I aeca7a-53 !2-11 e l-bacb-00 144feabdcO.html. 
2 1. Mark Schweitzer & Guhan Venkatu, Adjustable-Rate Mortgages and the Libor Swprise, 
FED. RES. BANK OF CLEVELAND (Jan. 2 1, 2009), http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/ 
2009/0121 09.cfm. 
22. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Sofia B. Vi llas-Boas & George Judge, Tracking the Libor Rate, 
18 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 893, 897-99 (20 II ). 
4 
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which ctre little understood, but many of which have great importance. The 
S&P 500 is the leading indicator of the state of the U.S. economy and the stock 
market ' s daily returns, with well over $1 trillion of investments tied to it alone. 
Almost one-third of all federal outlays rise with CPI, the Consumer Price 
Index, as do federal marginal tax rates? 3 Everywhere we rely on indices to 
aggregate information, guide our investments, and settle our contracts. 
In light of their importance, the scholarly neglect of financial indices is 
remarkable. As one observer has remarked: "Only a handful of economists, and 
no other academics, have ever looked in any detail at Libor."24 Critical thinking 
about other indices fares no better. Academics and regulators have largely 
ignored the indispensable role indices play in markets, failing to articulate why 
financial indices have grown so quickly in importance, how they function, and 
the risks they face. 
This Article attempts to answer the tough questions about Libor: given the 
impartial character we associate with indices, how is it even possible to 
manipulate Libor? Given the risks of manipulation, why did users trust it (and 
why do they continue to trust it)? Why would a bank risk its credibili ty through 
manipulation? What can we do to prevent potential manipulation in the future? 
But these are equally questions about all indices. Indices are the 
indispensable and invisible infrastmcture of modem finance, and this Article 
aims to provide the theoretical tools necessary to illuminate them. 
Part I explains how indices work. Section A shows how parties use 
indices as blueprints for investments, as referents for contracts, and as sources 
of information. Section B argues that these benefits are rooted in methodologies 
driven far more by human discretion than many might have expected. In 
explaining the inner life of indexing, we refute a myth of objectivity that 
prevents any realistic understanding of indices. Regulators and scholars alike 
ignore the ineradicable subjectivity that is part of the index production process. 
As a result, they fixate on solutions that eliminate, rather than manage, human 
involvement in index creation. 
We then move in Part II to our primary ambition : a the01y of fmancial 
indices. In Section A, we develop a taxonomy to categorize and illuminate the 
world of financial indices . Section B discusses the different motivations for 
23 . Michael J. Baskin et al., Toward a More Accurate Measure of' the Cost of Living: Final 
Report to the Senate Finance Commillee From the Advis01y Commission to Study the Consumer Price 
Index (Dec. 4 , 1996) (hereinafter Buskin Report], reprinted in GETTING PRICES RIGHT: THE DEBATE 
OVER THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 5, 13 (Dean Baker ed. , 1998); see also Alex M . Parker, Debt Ceiling 
Deal Could Mean Social Security Cuts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 28, 20 I I, at I, 
http://www.usnews.com/ncws/articles/20 l l /06/28/debt-ceiling-deal-could-mean-social-securi ty-cuts 
("Changing the CPI would affect Social Security benefits and retirement payments for federal 
employees, as well as income taxes, but could be billed by lawmakers as a technica l adjustment, not a 
tax hike or benefit cut."). See generally Bart Hobijn & David Lagakos, Social Security and the 
Consumer Price Index for the Elderly, CURRENT lSSUES ECON. & FIN. (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.), 
May 2003, at I (discussing relationship between CPI and social security payments) . 
24. MacKenzie, supra note I, at l l. 
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index production and argues that these motivations are the defining feature of 
each type of index. In Section C, we discuss the different risks indices face and 
the ways in which indices can fail. Finally, in Section D, we survey potential 
solutions to index problems. We show throughout that the model and taxonomy 
we have developed for analyzing indices predicts the risks that specific indices 
will face and the solutions that are best suited to those risks. There is no "best" 
type of index, no single solution that works well across index types, and no 
solution without tradeoffs. 
Though there are no easy answers, we show that the most commonly 
discussed solutions to the Libor disruption- market-based contracting, 
litigation-based enforcement, and government control over the process-are 
insufficient. We make an alternative proposal. We offer the first scholarly 
examination of the law-intellectual property law-governing indices as a 
business, and argue that it is intellectual property law that offers the most 
promising approach to preventing many forms of index dysfunction. For 
decades, financia l index providers had secure property rights, which provided 
incentives for them to produce adequate quality and quantity. Recent judicial 
decisions have severely limited index providers' rights, pressuring many 
indices to accept more conflicted and compromised business models. We 
propose restoring and rationalizing index property rights. 
I. How Indices Work 
A. Uses of Indices 
There are three basic uses for indices: they are used as (1) blueprints to 
guide investment, (2) contract referents, and (3) information sources. These 
uses explain why there are now over $ 1.6 trillion in assets invested in vehicles 
that track indices,25 and hundreds of trillions of dollars contractually based on 
an index referent.26 
1. Blueprinting 
One of the most important uses of indices is as investment blueprints. In 
the fmancial architecture of the early twentieth century, investment managers 
served as both architects and general contractors for actively managed funds. 
They would conceive of the investment strategy and then execute trades to 
implement it. But it will sometimes be cheaper for many general contractors to 
25. Knowledge@Wharton, If Index Funds Perform Beller, Why Are Actively Managed Funds 
More Popular?, WHARTON SCH., UN1V. OF PENN. (Feb. 2, 2011), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
article.cfm?articleid=2702. 
26. Kuo et al. , supra note 3, at I. 
6 
Index Theory 
hire a single architect than for each to hire its own.27 It is even possible for 
many contractors to work from the same b lueprint, capitalizing the cost of 
9rafting the plan across many identical homes. Indices are blueprints for 
investment strategies. 
An index fund follows clear instructions regarding which assets to buy in 
order to track the returns of a financial index. The S&P 500 's input list and 
methodology is used as an investment plan (buy these 500 stocks in such-and-
such proportions, and then rebalance the portfolio as the index changes) that 
many funds follow. In this way, Standard & Poor' s serves by proxy as fund 
manager for the many funds that track the S&P 500. 
The use of financial indices as blueprints provides three important benefits 
for investors. First, it allows investors to profit from economies of scale. 
Individual needs are often similar enough that a single blueprint will satisfy 
many different people, who can share the cost of its production. Rather than 
hiring a fund manager, a fund can subscribe to a financial index and replicate 
its composition and returns. Indexed investing is often cheaper than individual 
management,28 which can significantly increase an investor's overall return?9 
Second, the use of indices as blueprints can lower governance and 
monitoring costs. An investor in an actively managed fund may find it difficult 
to determine the quality of her investment manager. Returns may be determined 
by forces other than the manager's behavior, and expensive bonding and 
monitoring may be required to guarantee trust.30 However, it is easy for 
investors to verify the quality of an index fund manager. Such funds publish 
their expense ratios and how closely their strategy tracked the index return. 
These two variables are easy to understand and compare. The return from most 
S&P 500 exchange traded funds (ETFs) should be identical, subject to fees and 
tracking error, allowing competition to discipline managers.31 
Finally, index-guided investment lets retail investors take advantage of 
two of the most important financial insights of the late twentieth century: the 
Efficient Markets Hypothesis, which posits that market prices reflect all 
27. For a discussion of the shared management of an entire fund family, see Jolm Morley, The 
Separation of Investments and Management (Mar. I, 20 12) (unpublished manuscript), 
http:l/www.law .yale.edu!documents/pdf/cbi/Morley _The_ Separation_ of _Investments _and _Management 
.pdf. 
28. Vanguard Expense Ratios, VANGUARD GROUP (2009), 
https://advisors.vanguard.com/iwe/pdf/FASHERC.pdf (noting that Vanguard expenses to investors are a 
mere 0 .2% of assets). 
29
• Mutual Fund Fees and E>.pen.~es, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM'N, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mffees.htm (last modified Aug. 8, 2007). $10,000 invested at 10% return 
for 20 years yields about $60,000 if annual fees are 0.5%, which is typical of an index fund. A managed 
fund charging 1.5% would leave the investor with less than $50,000. 
30. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The01y of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-09 ( 1976) (describing 
agency costs in tenns of monitoring, bonding and residual loss). 
31. Even funds that do not track the index use it as a basis for comparison. Many funds 
compare themselves to the S&P 500 as a useful touchstone for describing risk and return. 
7 
Yale Joumal on Regu lation Vol. 30, 2013 
available financ ial information,32 and Modern Portfolio T heory, which posi ts 
that divers ified portfolios can achieve similar returns at less risk than 
undiversified p01tfol ios---or superior returns with equal risk.33 
At the intersection of these two theories is the index fund, which is an 
investment strategy based on investing in a diversified portfolio of passively 
managed assets. Asset managers rely on an index to provide the recipe for 
diversification, saving costs along the way.34 
Indeed, a broad consensus has emerged that passive, indexed investing 
outperforms actively managed fi.mds.35 When costs are included, index funds 
surpass actively managed investment strategies, year after year.36 As Burton 
Malkiel has put it, there is " [a] remarkably large body of evidence suggesting 
that professional investment managers are not able to outperform index funds 
that simply buy and hold the broad stock market portfolio" and that 
" [t]hroughout the past decade about three-quarters of actively managed funds 
have failed to beat the index."37 
2. Contracting 
While funds are concemed with index inputs as blueprints, contracts are 
concerned w ith index outputs as reference tetms. The use of indices as contract 
terms allows parties to (i) achieve more efficient coordination, especially in 
long-term contracts, and (ii) construct more sophisticated and precise investing 
instruments and derivatives. 
32. Eugene f . fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review ojThe01y and Empirical Work, 25 J. 
FIN. 383, 384 ( 1970); Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund PeJ.formance, 52 J. FrN. 57 
( 1997). The 1111plication is thai active managers are unlikely to discover underpriced securities; it is 
therefore unw1se to pay a manager to try to outperfonn the market. 
33. HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF 
Tl\'VESTMENTS 5. (2d ed. 1991 ). Smart investors thus diversifY their holdings to eliminate idiosyncratic 
n sk, eschewmg mdividual stocks in favor of diversified portfolios. See Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient 
Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59, 78 (2003) [hereinafter Ma lkiel, The Efficient 
Market Hypothesis] ("[T]he median large capitalization professionally managed equity fund has 
underperformed the S&P 500 index by almost two percentage points over the past I 0, 15, and 20-year 
penods."); Burton G. Malkiel, Retumsfromlnvesting in Equity Mutual Funds 197/to 1991,50 J. f iN. 
549 (1995). 
34. . Arguably, diversification is conceptua lly distinct from blueprinting because one might 
want dJverslficatJon either as the product of the blueprint, or in the course of setlling conlracls, or in 
order lo evaluate markets. 
35. See Standard & Poor 's Indices Versus Active (SPIVA), S&P Dow JONES INDICES, 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/spiva/en/us (last visited Oct. I 0, 20 12). 
36. BURTON MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET(2003); Malkiel, The Ejjicienl 
Marker Hypothesis, supra note 33, at 77; William F. Sharpe, The Arithmetic of Active Management, FIN. 
ANALYSTSJ., Jan./Feb. 199 1, at 7. 
37. Ma lkiel, The Efficient Markel Hypothesis, supra note 33, at 77-78. 
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i. Long-Term Contracts 
Long term contracts involve significant risks of opportunism. After the 
parties agree to terms, the market price may change, tempting one party to 
escape the contract in order to buy or sell on the open market. Amid this 
uncertainty, many long-term contracts require specific investments in 
equipment and processes.38 Fear of opportunism and breach discourage 
transaction-specific investments that increase the gains from trade. 
For parties who w ish to make a long-term agreement, there are many 
conh·actual solutions to these problems. For example, the parties could set fixed 
prices now, comp lete with a schedule of future changes (say, a 5% increase per 
year). Another solution is a cost-plus contract, in which the seller bills the 
buyer for the production cost plus some fixed margin, which protects the seller 
against price swings and eliminates their temptation to breach opportunistically. 
Alternatively, the parties could select some single price number to act as a 
referent in thei r contracts, such as the prime rate of a well-known bank?9 
Hopefully, that rate would move in keeping with their target price. 
Financial indices often outperfonn each of these options. Negotiating a 
price schedule encourages both parties to engage in potentially wasteful price 
research so that they can propose a price schedule that is likely to benefit 
them.40 Despite such research, the parties are likely to guess incorrectly about 
future prices and find themselves with an inefficient contract.41 
Cost-plus contracts suffer from high monitoring and moral hazard costs. A 
contract written in reference to the seller's costs may be subject to 
manipulation, provide poor incentives to control costs, and require expensive 
monitoring efforts.42 Cost-plus contracts also require the seller to make their 
costs known, spawning confidentiality concem s that the seller may prefer not to 
risk.43 
38. Nick van der Beek, Long-Term Contracts and Relational Contracts, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 281, 283 (Gerrit De Geest ed., 2d ed. 20 II). 
39. E.g., FDIC v. Blanton, 9 18 f.2d 524, 532 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he contract specifies a 
prematurity rate equal to FNB-Midland Prime plus one percent .. . . "). 
40. VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW 328 (2007). See also Alexander J. Triant is 
& George G. Triantis, Timing Problems in Co111ract Breach Decisions, 4 1 J. L. & EcoN. 163, 196 ( 1998). 
41. Paul L. Joskow, Price Adjustments in Long-Term Con/rac/s: The Case of Coal, 3 1 J.L. & 
ECON. 47, 52 (1988). "If the probability of wasteful behavior increases as the divergence between 
contract price and the opportunity cost o f the aggrieved party widens, price adjustment rules which 
narrow the gap become increasingly attractive." GOLDBERG, supra note 40, at 329. See also Keith J. 
Crocker & Thomas P. Lyon, What Do "Facilitating Practices" Facilitate? An Empirical Investigation of 
Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Natural Gas Contracts, 3 7 J.L. & ECON. 297, 303 (1994). "The payoff 
fro m indexing," Victor Goldberg s lates, " is from the reduction in the divergence between the contract 
price and the market price." GOLDBERG, supra note 40, at 329. To be sure, if the market price drops 
below the seller's costs, a market price index may tempt her to breach. But that is an efficient breach and 
should not cause concem. 
42. !d. at 329-30. 
43. !d. at 351 (discussing Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc. , 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. 
Penn. 1980) (A LCOA)). 
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As for individual referents, they may vary in value idiosyncratically. By 
contrast, indices' diversified character reduces volatility.44 Volatility matters 
because the power to breach a contract can be considered an implicit, or 
embedded, option in that contract.45 As volatility is reduced, the exercise of the 
option becomes less profitable46 and breach becomes less likely.47 
Effective contracting is about getting the best incentive bang for the 
contracting buck.48 In addition to effectively maximizing parties' incentives to 
perform, indices also allow parties to minimize the cost of negotiation by 
avoiding contractual questions that cost more to answer than they provide in 
benefits. 
Some contracts are notoriously costly to negotiate. Mutual distrust, 
collective bargaining constraints, and wage stickiness can make labor and 
employment negotiations costly.49 Perhaps for this reason, unions were the 
earliest advocates of the use of consumer price indices as a reference point for 
wage terms in contracts.50 A mutually amenable index may rein in acrimonious 
discussions without requiring parties to resolve every outcome. 51 
Scholars have long understood that contracts are often left incomplete in 
rational reliance on subsequent judicial interpretation.52 Financial indices 
44. /d. at 328. 
45. Paul G. Mahoney, Contract Remedies and Options Pricing, 24 J. LEG. STUD. !39 (1995) 
(using option theory to explain the common law's preference for money damages rather than specific 
perfonnance); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against 
Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1429 (2004) ("Rather than conceiving of 
damages as compensation, the right to breach and pay damages is better understood as a valuable option 
sold by the promisee to the promisor."); Tria ntis & Triantis, supra note 40, a t 20 I (arguing that 
expectalion damages encourage inefficient breach because they fai l to compensate contractors for value 
ofplainlifrs own lost breach). 
46. IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 7, 44-66 (2005); 
JOHN C. HULL, FUNDAMENTALS OF FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS 279-80 (5th ed. 2005); GeorgeS. 
Geis, An Embedded Options The01y of Indefinite Contracts, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1664, 1700 (2006). 
4 7. Note, however, that basis risk can be increased if an inappropriate index is chosen or if the 
index provider changes ils methodology. See Andrew Verstein, Interim Contracting (or Ex Tempore 
Conlracting) (Aug. 6, 20 12) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract=2125 169. 
48. Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 11 5 
YALEL.J. 8 14, 8 17(2006). 
49. See generally ARTHUR M. 0KUN, PRICES AND QUANTITIES: A MACROECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS ( 1981) (elaborating theory of wage stickiness). 
50. See generally THOMAS A. STAPLEFORD, THE COST OF LIVING IN AMERICA 256 (2009) 
(describing the r ise of the CPT in collective bargaining agreements). Irving Fisher insisted that his 
employees accept weekly wage modifications, subject to a wholesale price index established by the 
Index Number Institute. Robert W. Dimand, Irving Fisher and Index Bonds, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 224, 
225 ( 1999). His employees' resistance to this program, particularly when it caused nominal wages to 
decline, led Fisher to develop his theory of the "money illusion." IRVING FISHER, THE MONEY ILLUSION 
( 1997). One wonders, however, whether resistance was due to cognitive limitations, or perceptions of 
confli cts of interest: the Index Number Institute operated out of Fisher's house. See Dimand, supra, at 
225. 
51. Richard Posner describes deliberate ambiguity, another tool for avoiding a protracted 
negotiation, as "a form of compromise like 'agreeing to disagree."' Richard A. Posner, The Law and 
Economics ojContractlnte1pretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1583 (2005). 
52. Scott & Triantis, supra note 48, at 845. 
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provide an entirely new way to draft a less-than-fully-specified contract: the 
contracting parties agree to let the index provider decide the price.53 That way 
the patties need not specify ex ante every day 's price, but also they need not 
wait for ex post adjudication to know the price. When it is costly for contractors 
to decide, and it is costly for courts to decide, a financial index can decide, 
providing a type of"live" cettainty as to obligations. 
In addition to lowering total contracting and adjudication costs, this 
arrangement allows the parties to benefit from the index provider's expertise in 
pricing. 54 For example, the parties in Eastern Air Lines v. Gulf Oil had set their 
oil supply contract to follow the Platts oil price index.55 Their contract did not 
specify what should happen if oil price controls were relaxed for some, but not 
aU, of the relevant oil. It was probably rational for their contract not to resolve 
that peculiar issue ex ante. Yet, the parties might not have trusted a coutt to 
understand the commercial factors involved with resolving this issue. By 
contrast, Platts was we11 positioned to interpret how this market change affected 
the contract price. The index provider had detailed market data. It likely knew 
how other customers were affected by the recent market changes and it could 
use that information to make a methodological choice that jointly maximized 
all customers ' contracts. The parties in Gulf Oil did not fu1l y specify their price 
schedule for every contingency, but neither did they leave it to a judge; they 
left it to Platts. 
ii. Derivative Contracts 
Indices also enable cheaper forms of traditional investing and new forms 
of investable assets by fac ilitating financial derivative contracts. Many 
derivative contracts use a financial index number as the settlement value that 
determines who owes whom. For example, an S&P 500 future contract pays an 
investor the value of the S&P 500 on any given day. 
Retail investors can use these contracts to achieve broad market exposure 
and diversification.56 Sophisticated investors can use index-based derivatives to 
implement increasingly nuanced investment strategies. Suppose an investor 
feels certain that Exxon will outperform the market but is unsure of how the 
market will do. With index options, she can make an investment that refl ects 
this view by buying Exxon stock and shorting S&P 500 futures. The net cost of 
the transaction could be zero and yet yield the exposure she desires. 
53. See Verstein, supra note 47. 
54. /d. 
55. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gul f Oil Corp., 4 15 F. Supp. 429, 433 (S.D. Fla. 1975) ("The 
indicator selected by the parties was 'the average of the posted prices for West Texas sour cmde, 30.0-
30.9 gravity of Gulf Oil Corporation, Shell Oil Company, and Pan American Petroleum Corporal ion. ' 
The posting of crude prices under the contract 'shall be as listed for these companies in Platts Oil gram 
Service-Cmde Oil Supplement ... "'). 
56. IAN AYRES & BARRY NALEBUFF, LIFECYCLE INVESTING (20 l 0). 
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Financial indices also enable derivatives through which parties can hedge 
against the market's most daunting risks. Interest-rate derivatives were born out 
of increasing interest volatility, which created a risk that a bank's costs of funds 
would rise after having made a loan. Banks would have preferred to make 
variable-rate loans linking their revenue stream to the same forces shaping their 
liabilities, but borrowers strongly preferred the certainty of a fixed-rate loan. It 
might have seemed that either the bank or its borrower must bear the risk of 
interest rate fluctuation. 
Index-linked derivatives allowed a third option: the bank could lend at a 
floating rate and the borrower could swap the floating rate obligation to some 
third party in exchange for a fixed obligation. Through this sort of triangular 
borrowing, the risk can be shifted to a party with an appetite for it. These kinds 
of transactions are now ubiquitous. An ISDA survey of derivative end-users 
found that 80% of responding companies used interest rate swaps to manage 
interest rate risks.57 The City of Baltimore, for example, has "hundreds of 
mi llions of dollars" in interest rate derivatives linked to Libor.58 Interest-rate 
swaps are the largest fmancial derivative by far, and Libor is the referent used 
in most of those contracts.59 
Indices have also enabled investors to invest in specific kinds of assets 
that previously did not exist. For example the creation of the S&P 500 index 
allowed the creation of the VIX, a volatility index. The VIX, published by the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), is a measure of the implied 
volati lity of the S&P 500.60 The VIX increases when stock prices are unstable 
and decreases when returns are most predictable. VIX contracts allow investors 
to take a position on volatility itself. It has been enormously ~opular as a result; 
VIX contracts are among the most traded on the CBOE. 1 Changing one's 
volatility exposure is now as simple a matter as buying stock in Apple-it can 
be accomp lished in seconds with an online trading account. The future of 
indices portends only greater asset creation and accessibility.62 
57. ISDA End-User Survey: Interest Rate Swaps, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N, INC. 2 
(Oct. 20 I 0), hllp://www.isda.org/media/pdf/End-User-Survey-IRS-only.pdf. 
58. See In re Libor, No. I: 11-md-02262, 20 II WL 5980 198, at *2 (S.D.N. Y. Nov. 29, 20 I I). 
59. Libor is also a settlement value in CME Eurodollar Futures Contracts, among the most 
liquid exchange h·aded derivatives. 
60. Introduction to VJX Options and Futures, CHICAGO BD. OPTIONS Ex., 
http://www.cboe.com/micro!VlX/vixintro.aspx (last visited Oct. I 0, 20 12). 
6 1. Brendan Conway, Investing in Fear Is Big Business, WALL. ST. 1., Nov. 29,2010, at CI, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/S B I 000 1424052748703785704575642643319238142.html. 
62. See, e.g., Bhakti Mirehandani & Alexandra Connell, 27 J.L. & COM. 209 (2009) (cal ling 




3. Price Infmmation 
Finally, financial indices convey infom1ation, increasing price 
transparency and improving markets. Indices are powerful primarily because 
they solve collective action problems implicit in price discovery. First, price 
research is sometimes susceptible to the tragedy of the commons.63 Traders in a 
commodity are ex ante rational to investigate its price in other markets, as well 
as the likely future price. These research costs can become duplicative and 
wasteful as parties jockey for an informational edge at their counterparty's 
expense.
64 
Indices can discourage excessive price research by allowing parties 
to share the research and its costs. By selling the frui t of its price research, 
index providers like Platts can act as designated investigators, bringing 
information to the market at a lower cost for all. 
Indices also ingeniously solve the collective action problem of too little 
information production. Every trader has ptivate information about commodity 
prices. They may know something about local supply levels, about the most 
recent price at which they transacted, or even their own willingness to buy or 
sell. Because this information ultimately bears on the commodity price, it is 
valuable.
65 
Though each market participant enjoys free-riding on the 
infom1ation disclosure of other participants, none has an incentive to disclose 
her own. 
Indices obtain private information by offering the prospect of liquidity and 
diversification to induce traders to share it, acting as a platform for information 
trading.
66 
For example, the ABX index, which tracks the value of mortgage-
backed securities, has served as the settlement ptice for certain financial 
derivatives since 2006.67 Such derivatives allowed investors to place synthetic 
bets on the US subpri me market and provided a payoff for expressing 
contrarian views (when right). These bets would affect the public price of the 
derivatives, allowing others to see which way the wind is blowing.68 
63. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy a/the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
. 64. . This is akin to the racing problem often described in reference to homesteading and 
fishmg. Lotus Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis and the Law, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC 
ECONOMICS 1690 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002). 
65. q: J. Harold Mulherin, Jeffry M. Netter & James A. Overdahl, Prices Are Properly: The 
Organization of Financial Exchanges from a Transaction Cost Perspective, 34 J. L. & ECON. 2 (1991) 
(analyzing history of information control and frecriding around exchanges); Pete Locke, Natural Gas 
Price Transparency and Liquidity 2-3 (Oct. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.ngsa .org/ 
assets/Docs/Natural_%20Gas_Market_ Transparency_October%202006 _ Finall.pdf (d iscussing "free 
rider" problem in trading). 
66. Exchanges perform this function as well, but many assets, such as mortgage-backed 
securities, do not trade on exchanges. 
67. Press Release, Mark it Group, CDS lndexco and Markit Launch Synthetic ABS Index (Jan. 
17, 2006), http://www. markit.com/en/med ia-centre/press-relcases/detai I. page?dcr=/markit/PressRelease/ 
data/2006/0 112006-01-17. 
68. Cf DOUGLAS J. LUCAS ET AL., DEVELOPMENTS IN COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS: 
NEW PRODUCTS AND INSIGHTS 97 (2007) (describing importance of ABX index to infonnation). 
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Prior to the advent of the ABX, positions in subprime were expressed by 
negotiating bespoke derivatives with an investment bank. Gary Gorton 
identifies the "pivotal role" of the ABX, which by 2007, became "the focal 
point of the crisis," and contributed directly to the end of the real estate 
bubble.69 By increasing transparency for market pricing, the ABX made clear 
that a large number of hedge funds were taking a bearish view of the subprime 
mortgage market. The pricing of a trade-sensitive index immediately 
incorporates and reflects trade information and by doing so, brings a level of 
liquidi ty and transparency to a market.70 Once traders had incentives to express 
their negative views about these assets through the public medium of the 
index's prices, their opinions became the market's common knowledge. 
Improved and accessible pricing increases the efficiency of markets. Index 
prices may narrow trading spreads and lower barriers to entry.71 At the margin, 
some investors who have been deterred by high search costs may now be able 
to join the market, benefiting personally and improving liquidity for others. 
This increases liquidity for all participants, and so the value of the traded 
assets.72 
Information can also concentrate trading so as to generate important 
network effects.73 Network effects are a form of economy of scale, in which 
widespread adoption increases the total surplus.74 Indices can help to establish 
the index subject as the preferred contract or asset for traders, further increasing 
its liquidity,75 and generating secondary research data and derivative 
products.76 Traders and investors flock to the S&P 500 index in part because of 
benefits described above-low costs, diversification, and trusted judgment-
but also because others have flocked to it. 
69. Gary Gorton, The Subprime Pa11ic, 15 EUR. FIN. MGMT. I 0, 31 (2009). 
70. Cj LUCAS ET AL., supra note 68. 
7l. See l11dependent Price Assessment Data Helps Iron Ore Newcomer, Bahia Minerar,:iio, 
Mine for Competitive Intelligence, PLATTS (Ocl. 20 10), https://www.platts.com/IM.Pians.Content/ 
I nsightAnalysis/1 ndustrySolutionPapers/BahiaM incracao _ CaseH istory .pdf. 
72. J. Huston McCulloch, An Estimate of the Liquidity Premium, 83 J. POL. EcON. 95 (1975); 
Perry Mehrling & Daniel H. Neilson, A New Measure of Liquidity Premium (Jan. 31, 2008) 
(unpublished rna nuscri pt), http://www. peri. u mass.edu/fi leadmin/pd f/con ference _papers/d _ arista/ 
liquidity _darista.PDF. 
73. There is a vast literature on networks and standards. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY 
OF lNDUSTRlAL ORGANIZATIONS (1988); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, 
Compatibility, and bmovation, 16 RAND J. ECON 70 (1985); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network 
Extemalities, Competition, and Compatiability, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985). 
74. STAN J. LIEDOWITZ & STEPIIEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT 67 (200 1) 
("What most distinguishes networks from other instances of increasing retums is the benefits of 
increased size come from the demand side, the willingness of consumers to pay, and not the supply side, 
or the costs associated with production."). 
75. JOAO GARCIA & SERGE GOOSSENS, THE ART OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES: DEMYSTIFYING 
mE BLACK SWAN § 18.2.1, at 150 (20 10) ("Liquidity comes from the ... use of the index as a 
mechanism for pricing discovery and portfolio management of bespoke portfolios."). 
76. See supra Part I.A. 
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B. Methodology & The Myth a,{ Objectivity 
. We must clear some brushwork before indices can be properly understood. 
The primary obstacle to such an understanding is a myth of objectivity, which 
characterizes indices as near-Platonic mathematical constructs that exist largely 
outside of human intervention and creativity. Yet, financial index production is a 
fundamentally discretionary and subj ective activity. Recognizing the inherent 
discretion in financial index formation, we can seek solutions that improve the 
exercise of human discretion, rather than purge it. 
Despite the ubiquity of judgment, most commentators accept this myth of 
objectivity, and its persistence obscures understanding of indices' promise and 
failure.77 According to this view, indices are either themselves objective facts 
or else factual statements about the world. For example, that the S&P 500 is 
above 1000 is an observable, objective truth and one that does not rely on 
human judgment or interpretation. An index number is an observable truth, like 
the temperature.78 To the degree human choice is involved, there is only one 
proper choice for those humans: correctly convey the fact as it is. 
The myth of objectivity is common nowadays. Victor Goldberg, for 
example, has stated, "Indexing has the advantage of being mechanical and 
generally nonmanipulable."79 But the myth has a long history. Irving Fisher, the 
godfather of indexing, consistently speaks as though a given dataset can only 
be fairly represented by a single, objectively correct index number: 
l f we look at prices as starting at any time from the same point, they seem to scatter or 
disperse like the fragments of a bursting shell. But, just as there is a definite center of gravity 
of the shell fragments, as they move, so is l!bere a definite average movement of the scattering 
prices. This average is the "index number." 
Fisher suggests that there is only one true index number summarizing the 
data, and a functioning index should state it accurately. Within such a system, 
ambiguity of construction methodology cannot be justified. As one industry 
publication put it: 
The methodology [of a good index] should be mles based and transparent. For instance, 
the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 ... seeks to measure the performance of all U.S. stocks on the 
77. On the social construction of the objectivity ideal, see THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN 
NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE ( 1995). 
78. And yet, the temperature, too, has attracted attention as a subjective, social fact. See 
ALBERT CAMUS, NOTEBOOKS 1935-1942, at 98 (Philip Thody lr., 1963) ("The temperature ... is 
something too fleeting to be established in mathematical concepts. Here, observations are arbitrary slices 
of reality. And only the idea of an average enables us to offer an image of this reality."). 
79. GOLDBERG, supra note 40, at 329. 
80. IRVING FISiiER, THE MAKING OF INDEX NUMBERS 2-3 (3d ed. 1927); see also id. at I 0 ("It 
should be the 'just compromise' among conflicting elements, the 'fair average,' the 'golden mean.'"). 
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prima~y exchan~es .. The methodology is based on pre-published rules and is transpllffnt, i.e., 
there 1s no ambtgwly as to what makes a stock ehg1ble to be mcluded m the mdex. 
As no proper index permits the sort of ambiguities that might require 
judgment to interpret, there can be no justification for human intervention, 
which would constitute overriding the mechanical rules. 
Such pre-arranged rules are possible because the goal is clear-
accuracy- and the means consist of whatever good statistical techniques will 
deliver it. Fisher states that " [t]he fundamental purpose of an index number is 
that it shall fairly represent . .. the many diverging ratios from which it is 
calculated. "82 On this view, human discretion and creativity is anathema, and 
index providers should let the data do the talking. Index creation is a 
descriptive enterprise, not a normative one. 
If thi s myth of objectivity were true, Libor would stand out as an 
aberration and the source of Libor ' s problems would be clear: it broke all the 
rules. 
Libor is the average of the self-reported rates at which sixteen major 
commercial banks are offered large unsecured loans.83 Libor is managed by the 
British Bankers' Association (BBA),84 a trade association of UK banks, which 
controls the composition of the panel and the Libor calculation methodology.
85 
The Libor exists for ten different currencies and for 15 different maturities, 
. fi . l h 86 varymg rom ovemtght to twe ve mont s. 
Just before 11 a.m. each business day, a trader from each of the 
contributor banks sends Thomson Reuters his answer to the following question: 
at what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and then 
accepting inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?
87 
This question leaves much to interpretation: how much is "a reasonable 
market size," for example? The bank treasurer has broad discretion about bow 
to in terpret and answer many such questions, and need not keep her 
8 1. Francis Gupta, Indexes or Benchmarks: Wha! 's the Difference?, 1. INDEXES, Nov./Dec. 
2005, http://www.indexuniverse.com/publications/joumalotindexes/joi-articles/2049.html (emphasis 
added). 
82. FISHER, supra note 80, a t I 0. 
83. Actually, the number of banks changes from currency to currency and is not static. 
Currently there are eighteen banks on the USD panel, U.S. Dollar Panel, BBA LIBOR, 
http://www.bbalibor.com/panels/usd (last updated May 20 12), but there were sixteen at the time of the 
alleged manipulation, and tl1ere have been as many as twenty al one time. The Swedish krona, for 
example, CUITCntly has only six panel banks. Swedish Krona Panel, BBA L!BOR, 
http://www.bbalibor.com/panels/sek (last updated May 20 12). 
84. Libor is directly managed by BBA Libor Ltd., a subsidiary of the BBA ·.vith an 
independent board. 
85. Underslanding the Construe/ion and Opera/ion of BBA Libor- Strenglhening for the 
Fulure, BRITISH BANKERS' Ass'N (June I 0, 2008), http://www.aciforex.org/docs/markettopics/ 
2008061 0 _ BBA_ comments_ on_ Li bor _ fixing. pdf. 
86. /d. § 3. 1; Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ.1), BBA LIBOR, http ://www.bbalibor.com/ 
bbalibor-explained/faqs {last visited Oct. 10, 20 12). 
87. The Basics, supra note 4. 
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methodology the same from day to day, nor provide the BBA with an 
explanation of the methodology. 
For other questions, the BBA may provide guidance. Suppose a bank 
received a cheap loan under very peculiar circumstances, perhaps from a cl ient 
trying to show a vote of confidence. Is that a reasonable basis on which to 
submit a low quote?88 Or suppose a bank is able to borrow from its government 
at low rates during a time of crisis . Should that go into the Libor rate?89 
Ambiguities abound, some of which are resolved by the panel banks and some 
of which are resolved by the BBA. 
The submitted quotes are based on the bank's own private data, and the 
bank is nmmally not required to substantiate its submission, but there is some 
quality control. Of the quotes submitted, the interquartile mean is calculated by 
discarding the four highest and lowest quotes and averaging the middle quotes. 
The BBA can subj ect panel banks to inquiry for quotes that the staff-tipped 
off by publicly available algorithms- determines to be suspicious. In principle, 
a fraudulent quote could result in a bank' s ejection fi-om the panel, but 
investigations are rare and no bank has ever been disciplined in that way. 
Thus, Libor is calculated on the basis of a dozen or so banks' self-reported 
estimates. The banks and the BBA use their j udgment to interpret the question 
and the data. There is substantial room for discretion and relatively little for 
third-party oversight. 
Numerous commentators have called for refmm or regulation of Libor, 
implicitly accepti ng the myth of objectivity as a background premise. For 
example, Bloomberg CEO Daniel Doctoroff recently wrote: " Benchmarks such 
as Libor that rely on subjective assessments ... simply cannot accurately 
reflect market reali ties."90 If only Libor were objective like other indices, they 
seem to suggest, the world would be much better. 
Though distingui shing Libor as an outlier may be comforting, Libor is not 
unique in incorporating subjective intervention and judgment into its process. 
The subjectivity built into Libor, though surprising, is not itself the explanation 
for any manipulative activity, since in several respects all indices-to greater 
and lesser degrees- function the same way.91 
88. Yes, it is.lnte1view with John Ewan, Managing Di1·ector, BBA Libor (June 15, 20 11). 
89. No, it should not. Definilions, BBA LIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-
explained/definitions (last visited Oct. I 0, 20 12). 
90. Daniel L. Doctoroff, Op-Ed., A Market Alternative lo Libor, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2012, at 
A II , http://online.wsj .com/article/SB I 0000872396390443687504577563391057853800.html. 
Doctoroff identifies other problems, including conflicts of interest, that do not implicate subjectivity. See 
also Hannah Kuchler, BoE Governor Urges Reform of Libor, FIN. TiMES (June 29, 2012), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7a76a74a-c I d2- l l el -b76a-00 144feabdc0.hlml (reporting that Bank of 
England govemor believes that Libor should be based on actual transactions rather than estimate). 
91. See lnt' l Org. of Sec. Comm'ns, Discussion Paper on Benchmarks 4 (2012) (on ti le with 
author) (surveying the ubiquity of subjectivity in al l indices and concluding that "[!]he criteria fo r 
submitting data was nol always objective, with many surveys calling for judgments and subjective rates 
or prices . ... The composition and rebalancing mles . .. seem to be largely discretionary."). 
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First, index methodologies are goal-oriented, and require constant 
updating in light of the index's goals. Human judgment is required to set the 
index's goals and to evaluate methodologies that suit it. While Fisher conceived 
of index providers as reporting on the single center of a moving pool of data, 
real index production requires providers to take on the normative and 
expressive task of defining the center. 
Second, an index provider may legitimately decide to reduce the accuracy 
of its index. In fact, index providers must balance a number of 
incommensurable goods, including accuracy, tractability, and consistency.92 No 
index can maximize every value, and index providers must make tradeoffs 
among at least these three. Therefore, if two indices both purport to report on, 
say, oil prices, we should not be surprised or offended if they deliver very 
different answers about the market trends; constructing an index requires the 
subjective choice of which values to vindicate, knowing the effect this will 
have on users. 
Third, the data never speaks for itself; human interpretation and editorial 
content are ubiquitous in the daily function of indices, contrary to Goldberg's 
characterization. Once an index's method and values are fixed, few indices~ 
even so-called "market-driven" indices-operate for long without human data 
gathering or analysis. 
1. Goal-Oriented Methodologies 
Providing an index is a goal oriented activity. Operational challenges and 
ambiguities can only be resolved by human beings with the index's object in 
mind.
93 
To effectively steward an index is to be clear on what the index is 
meant to represent. Contrary to myth, there is no "statistically correct" way to 
transform data or maintain an index without consideration of what that index is 
meant to convey and the purposes it will serve.94 
For example, the S&P 500 is an indicator and bellwether of blue-chip 
America, meant to track the most significant large-capitalization firms in the 
92. More goals still can be imagined. The decennial census is conducted through a head-by-
head count of Americans, rather than statistical sampling, even though the latter would probably be 
cheaper and more accurate. Although some argue that this practice is preserved precisely in order to 
undennine accuracy, see Press Release, Rep. Nancy Pelosi, Suppo1ting Plan for a Fair and Accurate 
Census in 2000 (Apr. I, 1998), http://pelosi.house.gov/pressarchives/releases/prcensus.htm, it may be 
that this method privileges other values. 
93. Albert Neubert, Not So Fast, J. INDEXES, Nov./Dec. 2006, http://www.indexuniverse.com/ 
publications/joumalofindexes/joi-articles/2317-not-so-fast.html (describing index invention and testing). 
94. For an early argument that indices are only the data they aggregate, without reference to 
purpose, see WILLFORD I. KING, INDEX NUMBERS ELUCIDATED (1930). See also Milton Gi lbett et al., 
Objectives of National Income Measurement: A Reply to Professor Kuznets , 30 REV. ECON. & STAT. 189 
(1948) (arguing that there was no need to change the CPI as America moved from a focus on 
production, during the Depression, to welfare in the early post-war period). 
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leading U.S. industries.95 As companies grow and slu·ink, the dataset for 
calculating such an index must change96 and the appropriate changes are not 
self-evident. The S&P 500 component companies tend to be large, but not the 
. ~ 
largest 500 on the New York Stock Exchange. They are selected through 
additional filters, all subject to human discretion. For example, the S&P 500 
imposes profitability and domicile requirements, but its selection committee 
waives them on a case-by-case basis for popular or important firms.98 
In addition to the selection criteria, the committee must decide on 
selection frequency. If membership in the S&P 500 is changed only once per 
century, it will become a reliquary of dead securities. Yet updating the pool of 
fim1s every day would make it a "soup de jour" of American industry. There is 
not one perfect rate of change, and each point on the spectrum reflects the 
provider's judgment as to the index' s purpose. 
Interpretive discretion is essential even to indices self-described as rule-
governed and lacking in discretion.99 For example, Chinese firms have lately 
obtained listings on U.S. exchanges by engineering acquisition by moribund, 
yet still listed, U.S. companies. 100 A ll indices that track U.S. companies, 
including the Russell 3000, which prides itself on tracking the largest 3000 
U.S. companies without exception, had to decide whether such firms continued 
to be "U.S." companies. 101 
Even seemingly mundane mathematical operations can involve profound 
policy choices, and realizing that indices are goal-oriented can help one to 
disentangle specious arguments for index "improvement." For instance, in 
1996, a Senate-appointed commission identified "several categories or types of 
95. S&P 500 Equity Indices, S&P Dow JONES INDICES, http://www.standardandpoors.com/ 
indices/main/en/us (last visited Oct. I 0, 2012). 
96. See Kelly Haughton, Provisionally Speaking, J. INDEXES, Jan./Feb. 2006, 
http://www.indexuniverse.com/publications/joumalofindexes/joi-articles/2329.html ("Small-cap 
managers once held De ll; however, it hardly fits that category any longer. Growth managers once held 
Pfizer; today this stock is held primarily by value managers. Therefore, by nature, the indexes that 
properly benchmark these active managers have hjgher turnover than the broad-market indexes."). 
97. The largest 500 U.S.-domiciled companies are better found through the Fortune 500. For a 
comparison bet\veen the Fortune 500 and the S&P 500, see Robert Arnott & Li-Lan Kuo, Selection Bias, 
J. INDEXES, Sept./Oct. 20 11, http://www.indexuniverse.com/publications/joumalofindexes/joi-articles/ 
9743-selection-bias.html. 
98. S&P U.S. Indices Methodology, STANDARD & POOR'S 5-7 (June 20 12), 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/articles/en/us/?articleType=PD F &asset!D= 122 1 189509652. 
99. See also Emma Boyde, Index Providers Tweak Rules as Investors Raise Concems, FIN. 
TIMES (Nov. 18, 20 II , I :08 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/b02adf58-092e- l l e l-8e86-
00144feabdcO.html ('"You have rules, but in the real world there will always be exceptions to the rules. 
Rules have to evolve over time,' says Dimitris Mel as, MSCI executive director and global head of new 
product research."). 
I 00. !d. ("'We have had a huge amount of debate about what is and what is not a US 
company,' says [David] Blitzer (chairman of S&P's index committee], adding that it had been decided 
that the Chinese companies were not."). 
101. Jd. ("However, Russell, despite its strict rule-based philosophy, sti ll tweaked its rules 
after the slew of so-called backdoor listings by Chinese companies on to US markets. 'Sometimes things 
catch you by surprise,' says [Russell's director of index research] . . . . "). 
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potential bias" in the CPJ. 102 The committee found that the CPI overstated 
changes in the cost of li ving because consumers avoided many price increases 
by substituting other goods. The committee also argued that price increases 
may not sufficiently reflect increases in the quali ty and availability of new 
goods. 103 Even if the on-the-shelf price of mousetraps increases, for example, 
they may be considerably better mouseh·aps than last year's model. It may 
appear that the consumer pays more for the same, while she really pays more 
for more. Thus, many price increases do not change consumer welfare or real 
consumption. 
Alan Greenspan testified before the congressional budget committees that 
they could save $ 150 billion over five years by "correcting" CPI.104 Dale 
Jorgenson estimated that the CPI's treatment of housing costs from 1968 to 
1982 was an "error" that might be worth 25% of the federal deficit by the rnid-
1990s.105 As a result, in 1999 the Bureau of Labor Statistics began using a 
geometric mean instead of an arithmetic mean to calculate the components of 
the CPI. 106 This fulfilled the Boskin Report' s promise of more fairly 
representing unrecorded improvements in consumer welfare. 
Talk of correction and error fit well if one believes that there is a gold 
standard by which methodologies are judged, and from which they can 
objectively deviate.107 Yet, methodological shifts may also imply changes in 
the index's purpose. As CPI adopted controls for unpriced quality increases, it 
arguably transitioned from a consumer price index to a consumer welfare or 
utility index. Prior to the Baskin Report, an increase in CPI represented an 
increase in the cost of buying what consumers bought before, regardless of 
whether their consumption had changed. Today, an increase in CPI represents 
an increased cost of keeping consumers happy, through whatever purchases. 
I 02. See Soskin Report, supra note 23, at 7. 
I 03. This argument has long had its critics both as it relates to consumer satisfaction, Milton 
Gilbert, Quality Changes and Index Numbers, 9 ECON. DEY. & CULTURAL CHANGE 287, 291 (1961) 
[hereinafter Gilbert, Quality Changes] (criticizing theory for implying that "if someone gives up 
smoking and gets an equivalent sense of satisfaction from this self-denial, he has maintained his real 
consumpl ion and benefited from price decline"), and aggregate production, Milton Gilbert, Quality 
Change and Index Numbers: The Reply, MONTitLY LAB. REv. (Bureau of Labor Statistics), May 1962, 
at 544 [hereinafter Gilbert, Reply]. 
104. Adam Clymer, As Parties Skirmish Over Budget, Greenspan Offers Painless Cure, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. II , 1995, at A I, http://www.nytimes.com/ 1995/0 1/1 1/us/1 04th-congress-overview-parties-
skirmish-over-budget-greenspan-offers-painless.html. 
I 05. Consumer Price Index: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, I 04th Cong. 2, 40 
( 1995) (statement of Dale Jorgenson). 
106. Kenneth V. Dalton, JohnS. Greenlees & Kenneth J. Stewart,IncO!poratinga Geometric 
Mean Formula IIIIo the CPI, MONTHLY LAB. REV. (Bureau of Labor Statistics), Oct. 1998, at 3. But see 
GETTING PRICES RIGIIT, supra note 23 (disputing the Boskin Commission's estimates of bias and 
concluding that the CPI may slightly understate in nation). 
107. See, e .g., FtSHER, supra note 80, at 10. 
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This represents a change in the goal of the index, rather than a correction of an 
error. 108 
. The move to a geomeh·ic mean in the CPI lowered government outlays 
and union wages, while raising taxes, a result with significant political valence. 
This is why changes in index methodology can stir opposition from those with 
little interest in perfecting the science of statistics. Bill Gross, founder and co-
CIO of PIMCO, the world's largest bond fund described the change: "The CPI 
as calculated may not be a conspiracy, but it 's definitely a con job foisted on an 
unwitting public .. . . "109 Labor unions, long involved in index policy, opposed 
the change.110 Alterations in index methodology create winners and losers 
among those who relied on the previous methodology. The possibility for these 
shifts is an intrinsic part of index production. Ultimately, the shifts in CPJ 
illustrate how data selection and methodology are nested within an index's 
purpose, and how it is impossible to judge its propriety without reference to 
them. 
2. Accuracy: One Virtue Among Many 
Even if it is clear what an index is attempting to illustrate- be it consumer 
price, consumer welfare, or whatever else-it may seem that accurate portrayal 
of that subject is s ingularly good. Yet, it is both common and essential for 
index providers to deliberately reduce the accuracy of their index. In fact, all 
indices exist on a benchmarking spectrum where accuracy is balanced against 
an index' s other legitimate goals, including tradability and consistency. To pick 
a place on that spectmm is to make a policy choice about what social benefits 
an index is meant to real ize and who its key constituents are. Contrmy to myth, 
there is no ideal level of accuracy for an index without consideration of whom 
the index is meant to serve and how. 
Recall that indices are used as investment blueprints, contract referents, 
and information sources. These uses place different values on accuracy. Want 
to know the state of the Polish economy so that you can decide whether to start 
a new restaurant in Warsaw? There is an index that can help you.111 But that 
same index might let another user, a fund manager, set up a fund representing 
108. Nor does it represent the creation of an error, notwithstanding arguments to the contrary. 
For an argument against such an approach as a rcnection of consumer utility, see Gilbert, Quality 
Changes, supra note I 03, at 291; for an argument against it as a renection of aggregate production, see 
Gilbert, Reply, supra note I 03, at 544-45. 
109. Bill Gross, Haute Con Job, INVESTMENT OUTLOOK (Oct. 2004), http://www.pimco.com/ 
EN/Jnsights/Pages/10 _Oct_ 2004.aspx. 
110. See STAPLEFORD, supra note 50, at 356 (2009) ("Union economists recognized (how 
could they not?) that the main effect of adopting a constant-utili ty approach would be to lower the index 
to adjust for a lleged consumer substitution, new kinds of goods, and the quality improvements that were 
(supposedly) missed by current methods."). 
Ill. WarsaiV Stock Exchange WIG Total Return index, BLOOMBERG, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/quotefWIG: IND (last visited Nov. 14, 20 12). 
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the Polish economy. For the restaurateur, an accurate, up-to-date index would 
be of great value. For a fund manager, though, a continuously updating 
snapshot of the Polish economy could be a terrible index. That is because funds 
care about transaction costs and transactions costs may be inversely correlated 
with accuracy. 
Beyond mere brokerage fees, index funds suffer enormous costs due to 
opportunistic arbitrageurs. When an index announces that a given company will 
be added to the index, index funds are obliged to purchase the company. Index 
funds typically rebalance their portfolio when the change becomes effective, 
rather than when it is announced. Arbitrageurs, however, are free to bid up (or 
down) the price of the security from the date of the announcement, knowing 
full well that many index funds will soon need to buy or sell the security. The 
result is that index funds pay more when they buy and receive less when they 
sell than they otherwise would. The costs of this arbitrage are enorrnous. 112 By 
contrast, the Dow Jones Industrial Average has made no changes since 2009, 
and only 48 in its 115-year history. Its accuracy as a bellwether is sometimes 
disputed, but the transaction costs of use are small. Different users may prefer 
different tradeoffs between accuracy and consistency, given the costs the latter 
creates. 
There are also potential tradeoffs between accuracy and tractability. The 
Warsaw fund covers all listed Polish companies. Some of these companies may 
be small and thinly traded. It may be difficult for the fund manager to buy the 
representative quantity of shares prescribed by the index without affecting the 
price of the shares. A fund manager might be pleased if the index left off small, 
illiquid assets at the expense of accuracy. 
Tradability and consistency also matter to those who use financial indices 
as contract referents. Consider bow Platts modifies its benchmarks over time. 
Oil from the Ekofisk region of the North Sea bas traditionally traded for a 
higher price, and traded separately from Oseberg, Forties, and Brent oils. In 
2007, Platts decided to include Ekofisk oil with the other three into its Brent 
index, 113 which acts as the settlement price of NYMEX Brent futures. 114 
Though Ekofisk is chemically different from the others and generally trades at 
higher prices, including it increased the volume of oil within the category, 
which improved liquidity. Platts made a policy tradeoff between being an 
112. One study found that index fund investors in the Russell 2000 alone lost $560 million, or 
1.30% of their value, per year due to arbitrage effects. Honghui Chen, Gregory Noronha & Yijay Singal, 
Index Changes and Losses to Index Fund Investors, 62 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 31, 35 (2006). Loss statistics 
rise precipitously if assets non-passively indexed to the Russell 2000 are included ($4.86 billion per 
year), or if arbitrage statistics for passively indexed S&P 500 funds are included ($1.32 billion per year). 
!d. at 35-37. 
113. Bassam Fattouh, An Anatomy of the Crude Pricing System 38 (Oxford lnst. for Energy 
Studies Working Paper No. 40, 20 II ), http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/20 II / 
03/WPM40-AnAnatomyoftheCrudeOiiPricingSystem·Bassamfattouh-20 II. pdf. 
114. Brent 25-Day (Plaits} Futures, CME GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com/tradingl 
energy/crude-oil/brent-25-day-platts-futures_contract_specifications.html (last visited March 3, 2012). 
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accurate benchmark of Brent, faithfully tracking the represented material, and 
redefining Brent to improve tradability for Brent-traders. 
. Frequent and comprehensive updating is valuable for users who use the 
index as a source of information, but it is injurious to users who employ the 
index as a blueprint for an investment strategy. Index providers are 
conscientious of the tradeoff between accuracy, which they call 
"benchmarking," and tradability and consistency, which are together called 
"investability." 11 5 An index cannot be a perfect benchmark and perfectly 
investable, so providers must run their index with one or more constituencies in 
mind. 
Parties may disagree with the many ways that index providers exercise 
their judgment and discretion, but judgment itself is essential to the operation 
of indices and important for the benefits they provide-particularly in those 
cases where reasonable people might disagree. 116 This understanding of 
indexing illustrates the virtues of the price term at issue in Gulf Oi/. 117 In that 
case, the parties agreed to use Platts's West Texas Sour oil price in their supply 
contract. The market fractured when the government eased price controls on oil 
production in excess of 1972 levels. Chemically identical oils, which may even 
have come from the same well, could suddenly command a higher price in the 
market because of regulatory status. Unfortunately for Gulf Oil, Platts excluded 
the new oil's sale prices from its existing oil price index. 118 
A decision as to relevance had to be made by Platts, and no mechanical 
operation could serve this function. This judgment may actually have been one 
reason the parties used the Platts price in their contract. The parties left to Platts 
the task of trading off accuracy, tradability, and consistency for them. Is "new 
oil" part of the market for West Texas Crude? Reasonable parties could 
disagree, but by excluding it, Platts provided an answer informed by its sense 
of what tradeoffs Platts's users would want and expect. 
Indeed, to index users, indices' imbedded discretion may be their greatest 
virtue, rather than a vice. Parties may wish to outsource decision making to the 
index provider, which is likely an industry expert with a reputation for the 
values it weighs in responding to change. The value of indices in contracts thus 
depends on their ability to accommodate change through judgment and 
discretion. 
115. Telephone interview with David Blitzer, Managing Director and Chainnan of the Index 
Committee, S&P Dow Jones Indices (Dec. 2 1, 20 II) [hereinafter Blitzer interview]; telephone interview 
with Alex Matturri, Chief Executive Officer, S&P Dow Jones Indices (Dec. 19, 20 II). 
116. See Verstein, supra note 47. 
117. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 433 (S.D. Fla. 1975). 
118. !d. at 434. 
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3. Data: No Mathematics Without Judgment 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Chairman Gary 






d ' d ' d b h transparent. et, even transactiOn- ase m tees are me tate y uman 
editors who organize their data into categories. 
For instance, P latts has provided market-based oil price data, based on 
actual transactions, for more than one hundred years. Yet its editors do not 
contact every oi l buyer and seller in order to ascertain prices; they must be 
selective in how they obtain and weigh data in order to control submission 
quality. Moreover, editors estimate the value of irregular or unsold supply 
where price data is not yet available. 120 Platts even provides an index value " in 
the complete absence of trade."121 
The data that index providers gather, and how they organize it, represents 
subjective judgments about the market. The decision to count many things 
separately or instead to combine them into one category is a subjective 
judgment about the relevance of their similarities and differences, for which 
there can be no neutral approach. While Platts once tabulated Ekofisk prices 
separately from Brent, considering it sufficiently distinct as to warrant its own 
category in the ledger, Platts now includes Ekofisk as just one type of oil within 
its Brent index. This change necessarily involved editors' sense that Ekofisk 
was, or had become, conceptually similar to the other oils in the index. The 
ways in which data is gathered and organized can have profound implications 
for the subsequent analysis of that data. 122 The normative judgments required to 
organize data acquisition in this way inevitably influence analysis by the 
provider and the public. 
Daily data interpretation involves market savvy and judgment. Each day 
NYMEX must calculate the closing prices of commodities traded on its 
exchange. Sometimes this is impossible because, in NYMEX's opinion, there 
are s imply too few trades to make an assessment. 123 The day's closing market 
price cannot be obtained simply by checking the last sale of the day, because 
this might represent a peculiar trade that did not accurately reflect the market. 
But prioritizing trades that reflect the market requires a normative judgment of 
119. Peter Eavis & Nathaniel Popper, Libor Scandal Shows Many Flaws in Rate-Setting, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (July 19, 2012, 7:34 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/20 12/07/ 19/libor-scandal-
shows-many-ilaws-in-rate-setting/. 
120. See The Westem World 's Unsung 'Energy Czar, ' II NAT'L J. 1279, 1279 (1979) ("Each 
business day, [the Platts editorial director] issues his judgments of the approximate value of oil around 
!he world: a cargo of Saudi Arabian crude in Singapore, a tanker of gasoline in the Bahamas, a 
barge load of heating oil in Rotte rdam."). 
12 1. Plaii-ICE Relationship: Frequently Asked Questions, PLATTS, http://www.platts.com/ 
I M. Platts.Content/productsservices/products/ ice _faq.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 20 12). 
122. PORTER, supra note 77, at 4 1-42. 




what the normal market ought to look like. In those cases, NYMEX's "work 
appears closer to creation, to making predictions of expected values." 124 
. Subjective judgment is likewise present in weighting data. For example, a 
company issuing warrants- rights to purchase stock-may see its share price 
decline due to simple dilution. An index provider will try to negate any dilutive 
change in stock price, to prevent a cosmetic change from influencing the index 
output value. Yet, it is also possible that the drop in the share price reflects the 
market's belief that issuing warrants is unwise. Thus, even simply 
incorporating public stock prices requires index providers to parse conflicting 
interpretations and form opinions about which corporate decisions are cosmetic 
and which are unwise. Index providers utilize powerful mathematical systems, 
but human interpretation is creative and detenninative in daily operations. 
Il. How Indices Fail 
A. Taxonomy 
The number and variety of indices is daunting, and it may seem that it is 
impossible to organize them or even define their boundaries. This Part develops 
a taxonomy of financial indices with the explanatory power to illuminate the 
different motivations for index production, the risk profiles attendant to 
different indices, and the applicable solutions to those risks. This grammar of 
index analysis shows the interconnections between index motivations, risks, 
and solutions and provides a roadmap for preventing index failures. Appendix 
A provides a summary chart of th is taxonomy. 
Broadly speaking, there are three basic forms of indices. Public indices, 
such as the WPI, GDP, and corporate governance indices, all serve a public 
purpose of providing information without the ambition to recoup profits. These 
public-minded indices are policy-oriented and responsive to their creators ' 
agendas rather than profit. Many are provided by the government, but 
universities, non-profits, and individuals also provide public indices. 
Product index providers create indices as their primmy business. They 
provide the index and seek to earn profits by charging users for the privilege of 
the index ' s use. They make and sell their product-indices- j ust as other fim1s 
make and sell widgets. The S&P 500 and Platts are both product indices. 
Byproduct index providers produce the index as an inc ident to some other 
fi k . . . 12s F I . pro tt-ma mg acttvtty. or examp e, the Ltbor panel banks he lp to create 
Libor and the New York Mercantile Exchange creates the NYMEX index, but 
neither is prin1arily motivated by the desire to sell the use of their index. 
124. /d. at 116. 
125. On the distinction between production and byproduction, see Bruce H. Kobayashi & 
Larry E. Ribstein, Law as a ByProduct: Theories of Private Law Production (Illinois Law, Behav. & 
Soc. Sci. Research, Research Paper No. LBSS 11-27), http://ssm.com/abstract= 1884985. 
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International banks have always used Libor to support other products- at first 
loans, and now swaps- rather than as a standalone product. Byproduct indices 
exist in order to serve some alternative commercial purpose of their providers, 
and their creators may not even consider themselves to be in the indexing 
business. 
The explanatory power of this taxonomy resides in its ability to illuminate 
the interconnections between index producer motivations, index risks, and 
index solutions. 
B. Provider Motivation 
In this Part, we survey the different motivations for index production. We 
show that specific producer motivations can be broadly understood as driving 
the taxonomy outlined above and as defining each index model. 
1. Share 
Some index providers wish to share the infonnation with others. The most 
impmtant producer of such indices is the government. The Senate resolved in 
1902 to create the earliest federal index, a progenitor of the Producer Price 
Index, to investigate the effects of tariff laws upon trade, development, 
production, and prices. 126 Since that time, the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
("BLS") has provided dozens of indices such as the Consumer Price Index, 
meant to infmm "sound decisions in Government and business, or at home, the 
store, the bank, or just about anywhere."127 Thus, a provider may seek to spread 
the informational benefits described in Subsection I.A.3 to the index's users. A 
provider that cares about the coordination problems of others may create an 
index to spread the benefits discussed in Subsection l.A.2. And contractors 
frequently make use of CPI as a referent functioning as a price term within the 
contract. 128 
In addition to facilitating contracting, providers sometimes wish to 
empower others to discuss and research in a particular way. For example, 
academic corporate governance indices faci litate investigations into the role of 
cettain corporate bylaw amendments with the goal of advancing the debate 
within a broad academic community. 129 Index providers may even be pleased if 
126. S. COMM. ON FIN., WHOLESALE PRICES, WAGES, AND TRANSPORTATION, S. REP. NO. 
J 394, pl. I (1893); U.S. Department of Labor, Course of Wholesale Prices, 1890- i901, Bulletin No. 39, 
March 1902, at 205-09. 
127. What BLS Does, BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., http://www.bis.gov/jobs/aboutbls.hlm (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2012). 
128. How to Use the Consumer Price Index for Escalation, BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., 
http://www.bis.gov/cpi/cpi 1998d.htm (last modified Ocl. I 6, 200 I) ("Escalation agreements often use 
the CPI-the most widely used measure of price change- to adjust payments for changes in prices."). 
129. See generally Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of C01pora/e Governance 
indices, I 08 COLUM. L. REV. 1803 (2008). 
26 
Index Theory 
investors use the index as a blueprint for investment, fo llowing Subsection 
I.A.l.l30 
We generally associate an information objective with public indices. 
When the infonnation is shared with users, the public index provider delivers 
many of the benefits described in Part I, sometimes at great cost, 131 but without 
charging for use of its brand, method, or data. This combination of intentional 
direct production of the index and the absence of index monetization is the 
hallmark of the public index provider. This is why few public index providers 
are for-profit firms. Enabling others without explicitly charging is the sort of 
public good that governments and universities typically desire to produce. 
2.Sell 
Many of the best-known indices, such as the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average and the S&P 500, are created primarily as products for sale. Their 
producers are in the indexing business. Users who want to enjoy the benefits 
described in Part I may be will ing to pay for the use of an index' s trademarks, 
settlement value, methodology, or data. 
Many funds are pleased to use indices as blueprints for investment and 
pay a corresponding fee. 132 Some funds, such as ETFs, are required under the 
Investment Company Act to license their index from an unaffiliated third-
133 . . d. c . d II party, ensunng a capttve au tence tOT m ex se ers. 
An index's output value can be used as a settlement value upon which to 
construct financial instruments, such as options on the S&P 500, as described in 
Subsection I.B.l . It is common for options exchanges to pay large commissions 
for the right to offer index options to their trading customers. Users also pay for 
information. For more than I 00 years, Platts, which produces an industty 
respected oil price index, has been supported by subscription fees to its pricing 
services. 134 Even where the underlying data is otherwise available, indices may 
charge substantial sums for their aggregation and analysis.135 
130. See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Ma1/ers in COI]Jorale 
Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 823-24 (2009). 
131. FY 2012 Congressional Budge/ Just!fication, BUREAU OF LAB. STATS. (2012), 
http://www.dol.gov/dollbudget/20 12/PDF/CBJ-20 12-V3-0 l.pdf [hereinafter FY 2012 Congressional 
Budget Justification] (noting that the CP I is calculated through the primary research of thousands of 
employees, costing half a billion dollars annually). 
132. Vanguard's S&P 500 Exchange Traded Fund markets itself with the S&P 500 product 
name and uses the S&P 500's calculation methodology to select its investments. 
133. Application for Exemption Under Section 6(c) at 2 1-22, In re Guggenheim Funds (Dec. 
15, 20 II), http://www.sec.gov/Archivesledgar/data/1167303/000089 180411005522/gugg53122-
40app.htm; Guggenheim Joins Self-Indexing Trend, INDEX UNIVERSE (Dec. 21 , 20 I I, 2:55 PM), 
http :1/www. i ndexun i verse.euleu ropelnews/8129-guggenhei m-joins-sel f-indexing-
trend.html?ltemid= 129. 
134. See, e.g., Fox Rubin, iCE to Distribute Pla11s Services, Products Starling in 2012, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 7, 20 II, I 0:18 AM), http:/ionline.wsj.com/anicle/BT-C0-20 11 1207-708751.html. 
135. MSCI Inc., Annual Report (Form I 0-K) at 52 (Jan. 31, 20 I I), 
http://apps.shareholder.com/sec/viewerContent.aspx?companyid=MSCI&docid=7680285 [hereinafter 
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It is possible to make ballpark estimates of the rewards providers claim for 
their indices. S&P charges an iShares fund a license fee of .0308% of fund 
value. 136 For 2010, that meant almost $22 million from just one fund, for just 
one index.137 S&P reports $1.25 tri llion indexed to its indices.
138 
If it charges 
similar fees on that entire amount, S&P would make $400 million in annual 
c. . d . 139 revenue trom m exmg. 
Further estimates can be divined from MSCI, the only major index 
provider that makes regular public filings. If its financial information is any 
indication, then the indexing business is thriving. In 2010, MSCI made $350 
million in revenue from index-type products. 140 This represented a 52% 
increase in revenue from 2008. 141 Revenues have increased largely because of 
an increase in the assets under management of subscribing funds. 
142 
The 
ascendancy of indexed investing has been good for index providers and 
indexing is currently a high-margin business.
143 
It is profoundly scalable, 
requiring little marginal investment to maintain another index product s imilar 
. . 144 
to an extstmg one. 
3. Use 
A third category of index is made for use by a provider that seeks the 
benefits discussed in Part I. A provider may wish to blueprint its own 
investments, or create an index term by which to settle its own contracts, or 
ma intain the information gleaned in index production. 
MSCI Annual Report] (reporting that two thirds of the $350 million in indexing revenue MSCI earned in 
20 I 0 came from the sa le of data). 
136. SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust Prospectus, STANDARD & POOR'S 6 (Jan. 25, 20 12), 
https://www .spdrs.com/1 i brary-content/publ ic/SPY%20Prospectus. pdf [hereinafter Prospectus]. S&P 
also receives a fixed annual payment of $600,000. !d. at 25-26. This is an appreciable increase from the 
early days of index licensing. In S&P's earliest contract with Vanguard, the latter agreed to pay a mere 
$5000 per year for the use of all the S&P 500 data and trademarks. McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Vanguard 
Index Trust, 139 F. Supp. 2d 544,549-550 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
137. Application for Exemption Under Section 6(c), supra note 136, at 17. 
138• John Davies, S&P INDICES, Using ETF's for Strategic Por({o/io Construction, 
http :1/us.sp indices. com/ docu men ts/presen tat i ons/20 12070 5-presentation -da v ies-sp-indices-us i ng-et fs-
s trategic-portfolio-construction.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 20 12). 
139. S&P's total 2010 revenue was $2.9 bill ion. Key Statistics, STANDARD & POOR'S, 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/about-sp/key-statistics/enlus (last visited Mar. 4, 20 12). 
140. MSCI Annual Report, supra note 135, at 52. 
141. /d. 
142. !d. at 62 ("The growth [in revenue from index asset-based fees] was attributable to the 
growth in the average value of assets in ETFs linked to MSCI equity indices."); Guggenheim Joins Self-
Indexing Trend, supra note 133 ("Many such arrangements are based on a percentage of assets a fund 
accumulates. That was perfectly amenable in a world of upstart firms and funds, but looks much less 
compelling these days, when a growing number of funds are multibillion dollar juggernauts."). 





This may be because an index user has decided that it would be nice to 
avoid the costs of licensing an index. Index Licensing amounted to about one 
t_hird of iShares's total cost to investors, greater than all other expenses except 
for the manager's fee. 145 iShares may suspect that it could make its own index 
for a fraction of the $22 mill ion it pays S&P. Increasingly, funds are requesting 
permission from the SEC to make their own indices for their own use. 146 The 
prominent Russell indices are produced by Russell Investments, which then 
offers funds that re ly on them. 147 Other fund advisors are purchas ing index 
providers.
148 
Not only may creating an in-house index be cheaper than paying a 
licens ing fee, it may also be more discreet. A fund manager may wish to run its 
own indices, keeping the methodology secret, in order to avoid arbitrageurs and 
copycats.
149 
To the degree the SEC allows these exemptions, increas ingly many 
indices will be produced for internal use, rather than sale. 150 
More often, an index is made for use when nothing on the market quite 
fits the needs of the user-provider, and she may be best positioned to develop 
the index. Libor is one example of an index made to suit the users' contracting 
needs. 
Volatile interest rates in the 1980s drove banks to make variable-rate 
loans. At first, many floating-rate consumer and some commercial loans would 
be set in relation to prime, 151 but as early as the mid-1980s, financial 
institutions found that offshore interbank rates more c losely tracked their own 
borrowing costs, and that basing loans and derivatives on these rates would 
reduce their funding risks. 152 Rather than borrowing from U.S. depositors, the 
federal government, or other U.S. banks, there was a general move to borrow 
U.S. dollars from accounts that were legally located abroad, and bank loans 
increasingly incorporated these funding rates as the variable rate. 
145. MSCI Annual Report, supra note 135. 
146. Section 6(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 permits the SEC to exempt persons, 
securities, or transactions where it serves the public interest. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (2006). 
147. See, e.g., HBTA Russell 1000' High Beta ETF, RUSSELL ETFs, 
http://mssellctfs.com/Products/HBTA_Overview.aspx (last visited Mar. 4 , 2012) (offering an ETF that 
seeks investment results that closely correspond to a Russell-produced index). 
148. Alex Ulam, VanEck Acquires Market Vectors Indices, INDEX UNIVERSE (Nov. 30, 2011 ), 
http :1/www. index un i verse.com/sect ions/news/ 1 0278-van-eck -acquires-market-vectors-indices-. ht ml 
("The deal means Van Eck will now be paying licensing fees to a subsidiary instead of an outside 
company."). 
149. This is the argument of Black Rock, which currently seeks SEC penuission to produce in-
house indices for its funds. Application for an Order Under Section 6(c), In re BlackRock Fund 
Advisors (Sept. I, 20 I I), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/l 006249/0001 193 125 11239094/ 
d40app.htm. 
150. The ability to use in-house indices is partially to credit for the appeal of so-called 
"structured products." 
151 . Prime, or the prime interest rate, nms about 300 basis points above the federa l funds rate, 
wh ich is the interest rate at which funds on deposit at the Federal Reserve are loaned among banks. 
152. Jacob Gyntelberg & Philip Wooldridge, Interbank Rate Fixings During the Recent 
Turmoil, BlS Q. REV., Mar. 2008, at 59, 60. 
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Early on, the interest rates on these loans were set based on the cost of 
funds of the lending banks themselves. So if a syndicate were formed to 
collectively make a large loan, the loan rate might be written to equal the 
average cost of funds of all the members of the syndicate. 153 Because the 
syndicate would largely borrow in the offshore interbank market, this syndicate 
rate provided the banks with a measure of security that their funding costs 
would stay in line with their lending revenues. 
However, it was inefficient to calculate these figures for every transaction, 
collecting data from every lending bank. In 1984, U.K. banks requested that the 
BBA develop a method to publicly determine the interest rates on syndicated 
loans. 154 This BBA method, which would become BBA Libor, proved an 
attractive shortcut in syndicated lending, largely approximating the funding 
costs for the participant banks but at much lower cost and greater liquidity. By 
lending at a rate that aggregated their own costs of borrowing, banks could 
ensure that the rates at which they lent kept a close relationship to their own 
borrowing rates. W ithin two years, this preliminary rate had taken on a form 
very similar to today's Libor and had been so named. 155 Increasingly, 
syndicates referenced the BBA Libor. 
Gradually, L ibor's dominance moved beyond syndicated lending to 
encompass all short-term lending contracts. Banks link auto, home, and student 
loans to Libor. Corporate borrowers hedge or speculate on interest rate 
movements by buying Libor-linked derivatives, and banks willingly provide 
them. 156 Libor is an index that was made from the beginning for use by its 
providers and not for sale. 157 
Where an index is produced for use by the provider, it will almost 
inevitably be a byproduct index. Whatever the provider uses the index for will 
be the product for which the index is produced. For Libor, the banks make 
money for loans and swaps, and they produce Libor as a means of facilitating 
that business. 
4. Require 
In some circumstances, a firm may be required to produce an index, 
sometimes as a result of direct legal regulation. For instance, the New York 
Mercantile Exchange calculates trade settlement prices by virtue of its status as 
153. Richard M. Gray, Libor Market Disruption, MILBANK, T WEED, HADLEY & McCLOY LLP 
4 (Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.milbank.com/images/content/6/8/688/LIBOR_Market_Dismption.pdf. 
154. Mollenkamp, supra note I . 
155. The Basics, supra note 4; Carsella, supra note 5, at 48. 
156. See THE HANDBOOK OF CURRENCY AND INTEREST RATE RISK MANAGEMENT 2-10 
(Robert J . Schwartz & Clifford W. Smith, Jr. eds., 1990). 
156. Carsella, supra note 5, at 48. 
!57. The BBA does make a small amount from providing data access, but this dwarfs the 
importance of Libor for lending and derivatives. 
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an exchange, and those values constitute an index upon which other financial 
products may be based. 158 
In these cases, the provider does not intend to use the index to sell it or to 
benevolently provide it to the commons. Instead, the index is' produced as a 
necessary step in some other profit-oriented activity. As such, they are like use-
motivated indices in that they only arise as byproduct indices. 159 
C. Risks of Indices 
In the sections below, we argue that fmancial indices face three principal 
forms of risk: manipulation, underproduction, and malproduction. In other 
words, index users may be harmed by affirmative misuse, a dearth of indices, 
or by the low quality of the indices available. We contend that an account of 
risk that goes beyond manipulation r isk is vital, because many solutions to 
manipulation actually exacerbate underproduction or malproduction. 
Crucially, we show that different index types are vulnerable to different 
types of risk. Each index type can suffer each type of problem, but the relative 
likelihood and the optimal solution differs and depends on the motivation of the 
index provider. Though no one index type is best in all cases, we show that 
product indices have desirable features that are often underappreciated and that 
public and byproduct indices are problematic in ways not always considered. 
1. Manipulation 
The manipulation of a financial index--deliberate intervention in the 
index's inputs, methodology or output to suit the manipulator's interests at the 
expense of most users-is the most intuitively worrisome fonn of index failure. 
We show examples of manipulation from each index type, but we begin with 
Libor, a byproduct index. 
Three theories may explain why panel banks might attempt to manipulate 
Libor. The "reputational" account suggests that the panel banks were low-
balling their quotes in order to appear less financially vulnerable than they 
160 L.b bl. . were. 1 or quotes are pu IC, so If a bank reported increasing borrowing 
costs, it wou ld telegraph that lenders were avoiding the bank. During the crisis, 
no one wanted to be "the next Lehman," and banks had a strong incentive to lie 
about borrowing costs in order to protect their image. This theory is consistent 
with the fact that anomalous Libor quotes were generally too low. 
According to a second manipulation theory, the "positional" account, 
banks extracted profit from their clients by manipulating the rate upon which 
158. NYMEX, 497 F.3d I 09, 11 8 (2d Cir. 2007). 
159. Indeed, both use-production and required-production arc conceptually related examples 
of byproduct ion. 
160. See Mollenkamp, supra note 1. 
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their derivative positions were based. If one bank lends more with contracts 
referencing Libor than it borrows, then it will profit if Libor goes up, and vice-
versa. 
Many commentators are skeptical that banks would have a consistent non-
zero net Libor position.16 1 Yet substantial net positions, correlated with the 
direction of rate irregularities, are exactly what Snider and Youl e found. In the 
first quarter of2009, Citigroup reported that it "would make $936 million in net 
interest revenue if interest rates would fall by 25 basis points a quarter over the 
next year and $1,935 mill ion if they were to fall 1 percent instantaneously."162 
The source of such large positions, and their unexpected appearance, was 
banks' extensive swap operations. 
Snider and Youle's findings support the positional theory. They compared 
banks' swap exposure, as reported to the Fed, to their implied degree of 
misreporting of borrowing costs.163 Suggestively, Snider and Youle found that 
where Citi had a larger net exposure to Libor, and therefore stood to gain more 
from a change in Libor, it tended to make larger anomalous quotes. Even more 
tellingly, Citi had different exposures to different cutTencies. A rise in Yen 
Libor would benefit Citi, just as a drop in dollar Libor would hurt Citi. 
Consistent with a positional theory, Citi 's Libor quotes in each cunency were 
often in the same direction that would benefit it. 
Both the positional and reputational versions of Libor disruption tend to 
view manipulation as coming from the top,164 but recent details emerging from 
regulatory investigations suggest a third manipulation theory : the banks may 
have had poor intemal controls, allowing individual traders to manipulate Libor 
to benefi t their own trades. In this "rogue trader" theory, traders enter into 
small conspiracies with a bank's quote submitters, rather than industry-wide 
cartels. For example, Bat·clays Capital 's recent settlement with the CFTC 
indicates that certain swap traders made manipulative requests of the banks' 
rate submitters.165 
Banks may, as a whole, lose money from rogue trader manipulation. The 
Canadian investigation into Royal Bank of Scotland suggests that a bank's 
16 1. Duncan Wood, Libor Fix?, RISK MAGAZINE, July I , 2011, at 40, http://www.risk.net/ 
risk-magazinc/feature/208 1957/libor-fix . 
162. Snider & Youle, supra note 14, at 12; see also Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 22, at 897 
("Based on our evidence, biased signals coming from the ind ividual banks (agent aggregation bias), rate 
manipulation or collusion appear as one likely answer."). 
163. This data is found on Report FR Y-9C, published by the Federal Reserve Board, which 
must be completed by ce11ain bank holding companies. 
164. See, e.g., Supplemenlal Jnformalion Regarding Barclay.\· Sellleme/11 wilh the Aulhorities 
in Respec/ of Their lnvestigalions into the Submission of Various Interbank Offered Rates (AMENDED), 
BARCLAYS 6 (July 3, 201 2, 6: I 0 PM), http://group.barclays.cornlnews/news-article/1329926004 178/ 
nav igation- 1330349038798 (noting that the President of Barclays Capital may have ordered 
subordinates to submit lower Libor quotes). 
165. Bmdays Non-Prosecution Agreement, Appendix A: S!atement of Focls, U.S. DEP'T OF 
JUST. 5 (June 26, 20 12), http://www.justice.govliso/opa/resources/93 120 127 10173426365941.pdf. 
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traders might request help from a voice broker in tampering with rates. 166 These 
brokers help banks to raise money in the money market, and their complicity 
1)1ight make it easier to persuade an unwitting bank treasurer that their potential 
funding costs actually wanant a higher or lower Libor quote. The bank could 
borrow at a higher price than warranted, or other traders at the bank could lose, 
because traders wished to improve their own books.167 
It is sometimes thought that Libor would be difficult to manipulate 
because the top and bottom quartile of quotes are eliminated. 168 So, the 
argument goes, it would take collusion of more than a quarter of the banks to 
have any impact on the Libor output value. 169 This makes manipulation less 
likely to succeed, and employee-driven manipulation less likely still. 
Yet it is far easier to manipulate Libor than it may appear. No conspiracy 
is required if each bank individually expects to benefit by submitting a false 
quote. Under the reputational theory, any bank benefi ts from lowballing its 
quote, regardless of whether it influences the final quote. As John Ewan, the 
BBA officer in charge of Libor put it: 
It 's like a school offish. W hen a shark pops up, they all jink at exactly the same moment. You 
think they are acting in coordination, but they are not. They are a ll seeing the same st imulus, 
and reacting in the same way. They want to stay in the school, preferably in the middle of the 
school bep1\Yse that is the way they are most likely to not be eaten by a shark. That's not 
collusive. 
It is not collus ive, but it may be manipulative, and the net result could be an 
artifi cial rate. 
More importantly, any single bank may influence the Libor even if no 
other bank has the same idea. Any bank that moves the middle of the pack 
closer to the outer quartile will affect the average, and any bank that arrives in 
the excluded outer quartile may push another quote in that would have 
previously been excluded. This means that any bank may manipulate the Libor 
166. See Michael Mackenzie, Libor Probe Shines Light 011 Voice Brokers, FiN. TIMES (Feb. 
16, 201 2, 8:45 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/51 abc870-57ee- ll e l -bf61 -00 144feabdcO.html; 
Caroline Binham, Brooke Masters & Megan Murphy, Brokers Suspended in Libor lnqui1y, FIN. TIMES 
(Feb. 8, 20 12, 9:31 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/702 1 cdb4-527a- l l e l -ae2c-OO 144feabdcO.html; see 
also Application for Order of Additional Production, In re Inquiry Under the Competition Act (Can. 
Ont. Sup. Ct. J. June 9, 201 1) (on file with author) (detailing inquiry into potential conspiracy). 
167. The bank or its traders can also profit by providing information, or influence of the rate, 
to third party traders like hedge funds. This suggests both that extraction can arise from insufficient 
oversight of unauthorized employee activity, and that extractions can occur through beneficial 
relationships with other investors, even if the index provider itsel f did not seek to benefit from its own 
trading positions. 
168. See, e.g., Jacob Gyntelberg & Philip Wooldridge, Interbank Rate Fixings During the 
Recent Turmoil, BIS Q. REV., Mar. 2008, at 59,65 (asserting that man ipulat ion is possible if"conlributor 
banks collude or if a sufficient number change their behavior."). 
169. See, e.g., Donia O 'Loughlin, At Least Five Banks Manipula!ed Libor, Baulger, FiN. 
TIMES ADVISOR, July 4, 20 12, http://www.ftadviser.com/20 12/07/04/regulation/ regulators/at- lcast-five-
banks-manipulated-libor-boulger-wiGNdlnYsSTUiZ9CMYtgfJ/article.html. 
170. Interview with John Ewan, Managing Director, BBA Libor (June 15, 20 II). 
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rate in at least one direction unilaterally, notwithstanding the exclusion rule. 
50% can move it in either direction, 25% can manipulate it only upward, and 
25% can move it only downward. 171 Thus, in a given direction, at least 75% of 
the panel banks may unilaterally affect the average by moving the quote in their 
preferred direction. 172 Thus it is false to say, as many do, that it would have 
required coordination amongst more than a quarter of the banks in order to 
manipulate Libor. Such coordination would be necessary to ensure 
manipulation power in any direction, but any individual bank can unilaterally 
move prices in at least one direction. 173 And a bank with a robust net position 
would have a strong incentive to misrepresent, without requiring any collusion. 
Regardless of the reason, however, the manipulation ofLibor is intimately 
connected with its status as a byproduct. Byproduct providers have several 
structural features that make manipulation more likely. First, they tend to draw 
on privately available data, such as the bank's own funding information. That 
171. Imagine a panel of eight banks A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H, with "true" costs of 
I ,2,3,4,5,6,7, and 8, respectively, which is their Libor quote on Day I. Banks C, D, E, and Fare included 
as the middle band and A, B, G, and H are excluded as outliers, so Day I 's Libor output is 
((3+4+5+6)/4) or 4.5 On Day 2, none of their costs change. Which banks can manipulate the daily 
Libor? Surely, C, D, E, and F can each individually manipulate the outcome either by increasing or 
decreasing their quote (3+4+5+6 +/- n)/4= 4.5 +/- n/4. Of course, there is a limit to how much 
manipulation can be achieved in this way. lfC lowers its quote to I from 3, it will cease to be part of the 
middle band. Its quote will be excluded by virtue of being in the bottom quartile. However, B's quote 
will no longer be part of the outlier pack. The included panel will be B, D, E, and F with quotes 2, 4, 5, 
and 6, respectively, and the day's Libor quote will be 17/4, or 4.25. To be sure, C's manipulation was 
blunted by the exclusion rule, since she lowered her quote to I, but the value submitted to the average 
dropped only to 2. But she was still able to unilaterally move the range and lower the average by 0.25. 
The same thing would happen if C, D, E, or F were to submit a quote higher than the middle band; they 
would be excluded from the calculation, but pull a previously excluded outlier into the band. 
The outliers themselves cannot manipulate the Libor by submitting a false quote within the same 
excluded quartile, but a false quote that moves to the midd le band or the other quartile will change the 
output value. That is, B cannot manipulate the output by submitting a quote of I instead of2. B's quotes 
are already too low to be included. But if B submits a quote of 4, then she joins the middle band, which 
now stands as B, D, E, and F with quotes of 4, 4, 5, and 6, respectively, or 4. 75. Similarly, B can alter 
the range ifB submits a quote that is too high to be included. l fB changes from 2 to 9, she pushes G into 
the middle range. Thus the middle range becomes D, E, F, and G with quotes of 4, 5, 6, and 7, 
respectively. The average value jumps to 5.5. Again, B's manipulation was dampened by the exclusion 
system; B's submitted a quote that was 7 higher than her real value, but the Libor average only went up 
by I. Still, she was able to change the value without any assistance. 
If the middle range involves more than 50% of the panel banks, then even more banks may 
manipulate in either direction. In fact, fewer than 50% of the bank quotes are excluded because banks 
with quotes that tie the middle 50% are included. Thus, from Jan. 2, 2007 until Aug. 8, 2007, 95% of 
panel quotes were included in the average. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Libor Manipulation?, 36 J. 
BANKING & FtN. 136, 145 (2012). During that period, more than 95% of the time, a bank could 
influence the Libor total by changing its quote. 
172. Note, however, that there are conditions under which fewer than 75% of the banks can 
impact the rate. If all the banks submit a quote of, say, 4, and then bank A falsely submits 5, her 
submission will be the sole outlier. It will be excluded and the average will remain 4. [n such cases, no 
single bank can reliably alter the output value. 
173. [t goes without saying that banks with opposite signs on their net positions might try to 
manipulate in opposite directions, and thereby cancel one another out. If banks' incentives were always 
balanced, th is would provide a check on the system. We should be cautious before taking comfort in this 
possibility; it is easy to imagine reasons that banks' positions might broadly correlate, or that not all 
banks would manifest manipulative intentions, or both. 
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makes it harder to detect manipulation, lowering the expected impact of 
sanctions for manipulation. By contrast, many product indices, like the S&P 
500, draw on public prices and therefore are harder to manipulate. 
Second, byproduct indices do not themselves generate a large revenue 
stream, so index providers have comparatively less to lose by discrediting the 
index. By contrast, product indices generate revenue streams whose 
maintenance dilutes their provider's incentive to manipulate. 
Third, because byproduct indices are made alongside other product lines, 
their creators may experience conflicts of interest. It is easier and more 
tempting for Libor banks or their employees to profit from manipulation since 
they already deal in loans and swaps. Conversely, a product provider like S&P 
could profit from manipulating its indices only if it broadened its business to 
begin stock-trading. The opportunities for conflict are plainly greater for 
byproducts. 
Though probative, these features are neither necessary for manipulation 
nor limited to byproduct indices. For example, Platts provides price data 
through research and expertise that is hard to observe. It could potentially 
manipulate its price quotes without detection, and in the 1930s, Platts was 
accused of doing just that in order to facilitate the collusive practices of major 
oil companies. The United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. case, a staple of 
antitrust casebooks, concerned oil companies conspiring to buy up distressed-
price oil from the spot market that might have otherwise depressed the market 
price of their product. 174 The plaintiffs alleged that Platts enabled the cartel by 
publishing false price data, allowing the oil companies to buy up the distressed 
oil at distressed prices but still inputting higher transaction prices when 
computing the market price. Without Platts's cooperation, the purchase of 
distressed-priced oil could have lowered the Platts price in a manner identical 
to how the oil would be sold on the open market. That would automatically 
lower the price paid by contracts indexed to Platts and indirectly lower the 
price buyers were willing to pay in the future. With Platts's alleged help, the 
manipulators could maintain an artificial price. 
Even a public index may be manipulated, though typically for different 
reasons. Public indices are produced for policy reasons. Shifts in those policies 
could result in shifts in the index's functioning and output, to the benefit of the 
index providers' goals and the detriment of those depending on the consistency 
and accuracy of the index. For example, we have already described the ways in 
which policy objectives drove changes to the construction of CPI, t 75 and other 
examples are near at hand.176 
174. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 3 10 U.S. 150 (1940). 
175. See supra notes 106-1 10 and accompanying text. 
176. See, e.g., The Political Economy of the Consumer Price Index, BRIAN EASTON (July 15, 
20 I 0), http://www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p= 15 17 (discussing the political economy of New Zealand's CPI). 
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A substantial political science literature is devoted to studying the 
behavior of publicly minded entities, detailing particular risks inherent in 
public uses of money and power. 177 Public indices can become political 
playthings, subject to alteration for partisan political gain, and unlike product 
indices, the profit motive does not stand to di lute any manipulative impulse 
· h h 1n Wit t e prospect of lost future revenue. 
2. Underproduction 
A product is underproduced if the social value of its production exceeds 
its social cost, but it is nevertheless not produced. 179 Both index 
underproduction and malproduction typically result from a particular kind of 
collective action problem. A classic collective action problem occurs where a) a 
specific objective is in the interests of all individuals in a group, but b) the 
benefits of the objective cannot be individually internalized, leading to c) each 
individual attempting to free ride upon others' pursuit of the objective, with the 
result that d) the objective goes unrealized. 180 
Collective action problems of th is sort are to be expected in the context of 
the production of public or collective goods. 181 Pub I ic goods are those in which 
an individual consumer's enjoyment of the good is not diminished as the 
consumer base expands, and from which it is difficult to exclude any 
177. See, e.g., Mark Side!, The Promise and Limits of Collective Action for Nonprofit Se(f-
Regufation: Evidence from Asia (University of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-06, 2008), 
htlp://ssrn.corn/abstract= I 0906 I 6. 
I 78. See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: The 
Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 9-1 I (1998) (noting 
some of the features of governance, also applicable to olher paradigmatic public producers, which make 
I he polit ical risks of government failure especially likely; these include the inabil ity of the government 
to make c redible commitments). 
179. See STEVEN C. HACKETT, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES ECONOMICS: 
THEORY, POLICY, AND THE SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 45 (2d ed. 2001) ("Because those who benefit from 
positive externalities do not pay for them, their willingness-lo-pay is not included in market demand, 
and accordingly, market demand is too small."); id. at 47 ("If the benefits nowing to free riders were 
included in the market, such as through compulsory taxes or user fees, market demand would shift out 
and a larger equilibrium quantity would result."); WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: 
BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 217 (1989) (defining Pareto optimality as "an allocation in which 
no one person can be made better off without someone being made worse off"). 
180. The literature on collective action problems is vast. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND 
Til E SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY ( 1979); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION ( 1965); John P. Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1409 
( 1974); Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 9 I AM. POL. 
Sc1. REv. 245 ( 1997). 
18 I. William H. Oakland, Public Goods, Pe1ject Competition, and Unde1production, 82 J. 
PoL. ECON. 927, 927 ( 1974) ("The consensus ... is that private markets will systematically 
undcrprovide for collective goods."); William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive 
Externalities The01y of the Smaff Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 725 (2006) ("[A)ll 
members of society share the good without depleting it and none can be excluded from doing so. 
Tragically, therefore, no class member has any incentive lo bring the case. This is the collective action 
dilemma which results in the underproduction of the positive externality."). 
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consumer. 182 Users of public goods are inclined to ' free ride' without paying 
for the good, which can make it difficult for the good's provider to recoup the 
cost of providing it. 
Indices resemble public goods, because everyone can enjoy them without 
diminishing the benefits to others, and because they are nearly non-excludable, 
with index providers facing difficulties in preventing consumption of their 
goods and services. Everyone can benefit from a dependable public index f~r 
blueprinting, contracting, and information, but no one would like to pay for rt 
unless they must, and it is difficult to fully exclude anyone from the use of an 
index. Any one of us can compare our portfolio's results to the S&P 500 or 
purchase the 500 stocks it contains, just as we can contract to pay our bank 
Libor +2% on our mortgage. Because an index is information, its dissemination 
cannot be as easily controlled as other products, and it would be practically 
impossible for S&P or the BBA to prevent these small, private transactions. 
Where a provider of a good is unable to exclude users, and hence charge for 
their use, its incentive to produce is correspondingly lower. 
Each of the three index types exists against the backdrop of this collective 
action problem, and therefore each may be underproduced. This risk is 
naturally pronounced with product indices because of the difficulty providers 
face in excluding users. To activate a product market, a provider must be able 
to protect his index, which in turn requires some degree of enforceable 
intellectual property r ights. With the legal right to exclude users, a product 
index provider can charge users in order to recoup its costs and sue to prevent 
infringement, internalizing at least some of the benefits of the index. As long as 
it is profitable for the provider to generate the index, users can count on getting 
it. 
Of course, these rights can also create their own incentives to 
underproduce. Indices, once made, are essentially costless to share. Optimally, 
a provider would charge each user its tiny average cost so that few users would 
actually be excluded. Yet providers will sometimes frnd it possible to set prices 
higher, excluding some. 183 This restricted output leaves some consumers 
unsatisfied, representing inefficient "dead-weight" loss to society. This 
inefficiency is typical of monopolist pricing, 184 and it follows from the fact that 
intellectual property rights give a producer a limited monopoly on the index. 
Anyone who wants to use the S&P 500 must get permission from S&P. Some 
182. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. Wt·IINSTON & JERRY R. GRJ:lEN, 
MICRO ECONOMIC THEORY 359-60 ( I 995). 
183. Economists typically define market power as the ability to maintain prices above a 
competilivc level. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande & Steven C. Salop, Monopoly 
Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 24 1, 247 (1987). The Supreme Court has 
defined market power as "the ability to raise prices above those thai would be charged in a competitive 
market." NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984); see also William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 977 ( I 98 1). 
184. EINER ELHAUGE, UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 6 (2008). 
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estimates put the cost ofrnonopolistic behavior by product indices well into the 
billions of dollars per year.185 A thriving product market solves the collective 
action problem but introduces monopoly output restrictions; the balance of 
these two effects w ill determine the net effect on underproduction. 
Public indices represent a classic form of response to a collective action 
problem. Certain important public goods are often best produced through 
government provision by public funds, such as military defense, or natural 
monopolies, like water uti lities. Similarly, some indices can be produced even 
when the index itself generates no revenue. Revenue-indifferent public index 
providers do some work in filling gaps in the market, providing an index even 
where it would be hard to cover its costs through user-revenues. The BLS, for 
example, spends more than half a billion dollars annually in providing public 
indices such as the PPI and CPI without attempting to charge for them. 186 
However, there is no reason to think that the government will fu lly solve the 
underproduction problem. If provision of the index is not a priority-if, for 
instance, Congress has cut the department's budget or considers the subject 
matter politically unattractive-then the mere existence of user utility will not 
compel the production of the index and underproduction will persist. By 
contrast, a product provider is more likely to produce an index whenever users 
would find it valuable. 
Moreover, even when public indices are provided, they may simply be 
unable to perform certain roles. It is hard to imagine BLS creating a Libor 
substitute, for instance, since many market participants flocked to Libor 
. I .d II d . d. 187 prectse y to avot government-contra e m tees. 
The third type of index, byproduct indices, can often escape the collective 
action problem without resorting to public provision or intellectual property. If 
an index must be produced in order to pursue other profitable business, then its 
provider need not find some way to charge for the index itself. However, like a 
public index provider, a byproduct index provider is unlikely to increase or 
maintain index production just because users find it valuable. The byproduct 
index can disappear or remain static, even as demand grows, if the primary 
product is not sufficiently profitable. 
For example, banks publish their prime rate, the rate at which they lend to 
their best customers, in the course of their business, which allows others to 
185. Chicago Bd. o f Options Exch., Inc. v. lnt ' l Sec. Exch., LLC, No. 06-CH-24798, at 14 (Ill. 
Cir. Ct. July 8, 20 l 0), http://www.sec.gov.lcomments/sr-ise-20 l2-022/ise20 l222-2.pdf (noting that 
plaintiffs' expert estimated $2 to $9.7 bill ion in potential savings to investors arising from inter-
exchange price competit ion on DJIA and S&P 500 alone). 
186. FY 2012 Congressional Budget Justijication, supra note 13 1, at 2 ($647 million budget). 
187. See, e.g. , Michael Carsella, The LJBOR Controversy Part 11: Focusing Allen/ion on Basis 
Risk and Loan Profitability, SECURED LENDER, May/June 20 l 0, at 44, 45, http://www.thesecuredlender-
dig ital.com/thesecuredlender/20 I 00506#pg46 ("Libor is a more accurate reflection of the true financing 
market because it is based on daily market rates for interbank unsecured loans, whereas the FFTR 
[Federal Funds Target Rate] is laden with the more political goals of controlling inflation and 
maintaining healthy economic growth (remember, Prime generally mirrors the FFTR plus 3%)."). 
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construct indices based on this data for free. However, if the bank leaves the 
primary business line that generates prime data, the data will disappear. 
Casebooks are replete with the problems observed when banks go out of 
business, and so stop byproduction of their prime rate. 188 The reference rate 
term for the note then has no referent, leaving the borrower's obligations 
uncertain. Freeriders on byproduct indices risk being left in the lurch. 
Moreover, courts seem insufficiently sensitive to the risks faced by 
byproduct indices. To take one recent example, the New York Mercantile 
Exchange has sought to treat its NYMEX commodity price index as a product 
index, charging users for the right to incorporate the index into exchange traded 
derivatives and denying access to non-payers, but courts have forbidden this 
move.
189 
Courts, in addressing the risk that NYMEX might cease to produce 
the index if it cannot monetize it, seem to assume that because the index is 
produced as an incident of other projects, it is not dependent upon license fee 
revenue: "NYMEX needs no such incentives here. In order to establish a 
functioning commodities market it must have a price at which to settle open 
positions. Furthermore, NYMEX is required by Jaw to record settlement prices 
" t90 NYMEX's exchange business, its primary product, entails the creation 
of the index as a byproduct, and the court is happy to Jet the law dragoon 
NYMEX's publication of the index as well. 
But the NYMEX court, and courts relying on similar logic, neglect an 
important danger: preventing the monetization of the NYMEX index leaves the 
index's existence and quality wholly dependent on the primary product. If the 
New York Mercantile Exchange's business shrinks, the NYMEX indices may 
disappear. Even if the indices do not disappear, they may not be improved to 
the level that they might if doing so brought extra revenue. Cases like NYMEX 
dilute incentives to maintain or increase the quality of the byproduct. 
3. Malproduction 
Malproduction refers to the inefficient or suboptimal management of an 
index. For example, index providers can fai l to take account of the effect of 
their changes on their users, neglect their responsibi lities for updating the 
index, or hire cheap but untalented staff. Each type of index is susceptible to 
188. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Blanton, 918 F.2d 524, 532-33 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(upholding application of a a substitute prime rate and rejecting the argument " that the applicable 
postmaturity rate should be one percent because the contract specifies a prematurity rate equal to FNB-
Midland Prime plus one percent, and upon FNB-Midland's insolvency, FNB-Midland Pri me evaporated, 
leaving one percent"). 
188. See, e.g., Blantou, 9 18 F.2d at 532 (applying a substitute prime rate); Montgomery First 
Corp. v. Caprock lnv. Corp., 89 S.W.3d 179, 186 (Tex. App. 2002) (denying summary judgment to a 
note holder who failed to establish the amount due on a note, where note had been paid in reference to 
the base rate of a defunct bank). 
189. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinental Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007). 
190. /d. at 118. 
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malproduction, but the risk of malproduction faced by byproduct indices is the 
subtlest and most important. 
Least likely to malproduce are product indices, which are encouraged by 
market pressure to maintain index quality for their users. 191 Though market 
power may sometimes pem1it them some slack in their operations, 192 their only 
affitmative incentive for malproduction involves cost savings. 
Lacking the disciplining effects of the market, a public index provider 
may be more likely to neglect its operations. Public index malproduction seems 
to be at the heart of the infamous ALCOA case, in which a supply contract for 
alumina smelting failed to keep pace with the seller's cost of production. 193 
Although scholars such as Goldberg have criticized the design of the 
contract, 194 much of the parties' problem came from the mal production of a 
neglected public index. The contract tied ALCOA's costs to WPI-IC, an 
ancestor of the producer price index. The WPI-IC index may have been a fine 
choice for a price index in 1967, having been greatly expanded and reclassified 
only months prior, 195 but it would proceed to go almost ten years without any 
substantial update, becoming progressively less relevant. By 1975, ilie director 
of the Council on Wage and Price Stability criticized the index for presenting 
" totally inadequate data." 196 In particular, BLS did not update the index to 
reflect the massive effect of the I 973 oil embargo on production costs. 197 
It is not that public indices are themselves disposed to malproduction; 
instead, lack of a profit motive means that discipline must come from the 
provider's own accountability structure. Byproduct and public indices similarly 
lack the profit incentive for optimal index production that product indices 
possess. Because WPI-IC was a public index produced by the govemment, its 
continued vitality was bureaucratically and politically contingent. 
The most interesting cases of malproduction concem byproduct indices, 
which will often have an incentive to malproduce. Understanding exactly why, 
however, requires a more in-depth analysis of the byproduction index model. 
Byproduction is a species of what economists call "joint production," which 
involves one firm producing multiple products. 198 Byproduction is the subset of 
191. See iJ?fi·a Part II .D. !. 
192. See supra note 183. 
193. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W. D. Pa. 1980) (ALCOA) . 
194. GOLDBERG, supra note 40, at 349 (calling the contract "poorly structured" and "pretty 
much doomed from the start"). 
!95. JOSEPH P. GOLDBERG & WILLIAM T. MOVE, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE FIRST HUNDRED 
YEARS OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 235 (!985). 
196. !d. 
197. /d. at 236 (noting that the Secretary of Labor acknowledged that BLS failed to provide 
adequate wholesale price data regarding petroleum products). 
198. M. lshaq Nadiri, Joint Production, iu 2 The New Palgrave: A Dictionmy of Economics 
1028 (John Eatwell et al. eels., 1987). 
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joint production in which one product is created largely as a side effect of the 
inputs made available by the dominant product's creation process. 199 
. An example should make the background idea intuitive. A company, 
seeing a lucrative opportunity for a leather goods business, may begin raising 
cattle. They will, as a result, have a significant amount of beef available and 
may begin a subsidiary beef-selling line as a byproduct business. They will do 
so even if the benefits of selling beef do not match the cost of an independent 
cattle-raising business for selling beef. They may even give away the beef for 
free. Consumers, as a result, may often get cheaper beef from the 
byproducer.200 But they should not expect the beef to meet the highest 
standards of quality. The best leather cows may not make the best beef. 
Like beef produced jointly with leather, byproduct indices may often be 
offered at lower cost to users than product indices would be, but may be 
managed in whatever way best serves the primary product, which in turn may 
not be the best for the index user. Libor is produced with information generated 
through banks' ordinary lending business, and it is used to support thei r 
derivatives business. Many users write contracts to Libor without paying for it, 
like consumers enjoying leftover beef. 
For another example, consider the ways that an index affiliated with an 
exchange might be exploited to benefit the latter. FTSE has recently included 
questionable Russian firms on its indices even though they differ from the blue-
chip English firms that make up most of its roster.201 This perplexing behavior 
can be explained as malproduction. Many funds use FTSE indices as blueprints 
for exposure to high-quality UK companies. If questionable firms are placed on 
a FTSE index, they may be purchased by investors who rely on the index. 
FTSE is owned by the London Stock Exchange (LSE), which generates 
substantial profits from listing fees. If LSE makes clear to firms that listing on 
the LSE ensures a place on a FTSE index, risky issuers might tender steep 
listing fees as the price of reaching investors that would previously have 
avoided them.202 This might displease FTSE-linked funds and risk FTSE's 
199. See generally John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Economies of Scope, 71 AM. ECON. 
REV. 268, 268 (1981) (discussing aspects of joint production and shared inputs) [hereinafter Panzar & 
W illig, Economies of Scope]; John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Economies of Scale in Multi-Output 
Production, 91 Q. J. ECON. 481, 484 ( t 977) (discussing joint production). 
200. Panzar & Wi llig, Economies of Scope, supra note 199, at 268 (providing a theoretical 
overview of economies of scope); David J. Teece, Economies of Scope and the Scope of the Ente1prise, 
t J . ECON. BEHAVIOR & 0RG. 223 ( t 980). 
20 1. FTSE 100 Reshuffle as Russian Mining Companies Move In, MINDFUL MONEY (Dec. 6, 
20 I t ), http://www.mindfutmoney .co.uk/8984/ investing-strategy/ftse - 1 00-rcshuffle-as-russian-min ing-
companies-move-in.htrnl [hereinafter Reshuffle]. See generally Courtney Weaver, Russian Groups Gain 
a Toehold in FTSE 100, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2011, 9:08PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/99c22806-
20f4- l I e t -8a43-00 144feabdcO.html (describing govemance concerns for Russian !inns). 
202. See Megan Davies & Melissa Akin, Fear of Kremlin Whim Stalks Russian FTSE Hopes, 
REUTERS (Oct. 28, 20 t I, 9:32 AM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/20 I Ill 0/28/uk-russia-ftsc-listings-
idUK.LNE79ROOY20lll028; Jlya Khrennikov, Evraz, Polymelal Join FTSE 100 lo Escape Russia 
Count1y Risk, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 7, 2011, 3:53 PM), http://www.bloombcrg.com/news/20 1 t-12-07/ 
evraz-polymetal-jo in-ftse-1 00-to-escape-russia-country-risk-l-.htmt. 
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long-term credibility,203 but these could be acceptable results for LSE if it 
sufficiently benefits its listing enterprise. On our terms, LSE would be treating 
the FTSE as a byproduct in service of its exchange business, which leads to 
malproduction. As a wave of mergers unite index business with other firms, 
even product indices will face byproduct-like incentives to malproduce.204 
III. Fixing Indices 
This Section presents various solutions to manage the risks associated 
with indexing. Our taxonomic analysis from earlier bears fruit in this section 
primari ly by illuminating the relationship between the motivations for an 
index's production and the risks attendant to it, which clarifies how a solution 
can be carefully tailored to the specific risks a particular index generates. 
We consider a full range of responses to indexing risks. In Part A, we 
evaluate three types of solutions that have attracted attention. We show that 
market forces and the threat of enforcement can serve a role in reducing 
malproduction and manipulation, particularly for product indices. However, 
these tools are of limited uti lity for addressing underproduction, since you 
cannot punish an index into existence. Likewise, such discipline may be less 
useful to improve public and byproduct indices because they are less 
responsive to profit-based or coercive pressures. We next show how good 
governance and best practices in index production can help to reduce the risk of 
malproduction and manipulation, especially for public indices, but that it can be 
difficult to dictate good governance tenns. It is often easier for product 
providers to design good governance themselves when incentives are aligned. 
We are therefore cautious about the government prescribing one-size-fits-all 
rules for index methodologies. 
Given this reality, we argue in Part B that the best way to reduce the risks 
associated with index provision may be to bolster providers' intellectual 
property rights in their indices. Strengthened intellectual property would 
provide incentives for product providers to better tend to their indices, and 
encourage byproduct indices to transition to product status in order to take 
advantage of increased opportunities for benefit internalization. This would 
increase index competition, sharpening incentives against underproduction and 
malproduction while diluting incentives to manipulate. 
The current intellectual property regime governing indices fails to provide 
these incentives. It is weak and incoherent. A better regime would encourage 
203. Reshuffle, supra note 20 I. 
204. See, e.g., Ann Saphir, CBOE: Only 'Positives ' From CME's S&P Index Deal, REUTERS 
~Oct. 5, 2011, 11 :08 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/20 11/ 1 0/05/cboe-indexes-
JdUSWE~9 1 1220 Il l 005 (describing CME Group, an options exchange, taking a stake in S&P indices); 
Ben Harnngton, Pearson Sells £450m Stake in FTSE to London Stock Exchange, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 12, 




byproduct producers to operate more like product indices. The combination of 
intellectual property with market pressure, enforcement, and good governance 
!pay hold promise for addressing the most difficult byproduct problems, such as 
a Libor manipulation. This argument has been not only been overlooked but in 
some cases actively blocked by the current intellectual property regime, to the 
detriment of providers and consumers alike. 
A. Evaluating Solutions 
1. Market Solutions 
Two features of markets can potentially manage index risk. First, market 
competition will discipline product index providers to maintain quality on pain 
of losing their users to another provider. To retain users, a provider must limit 
malproduction and manipulation. However, the strength of competitive forces 
will depend on the index provider's stance toward losing its users, and the cost 
of users transitioning to a new index. 
Unfortunately, the cost for users to transition to a new index may be high. 
Indices enjoy substantial network effects, and so, just as with trading venues, 
we should expect the dominance of one index in a given niche.205 An index 
may become so dominant that one would give up substantial benefits by opting 
for a competitor.206 Some users may prefer a malproduced or manipulated 
index to one that is less liquid or well-known.207 
Risks may be greater for less liquid users. The network effects of indices 
are particularly apparent in long-term relationships.208 Many swaps, corporate 
bonds, and mortgages are written for terms of decades. Therefore, leaving a bad 
index could create significant transaction costs as parties renegotiate their 
contracts to select a new index. 
Despite these challenges, competition sti ll sets a boundary on the extent of 
malproduction. Whatever costs users face in leaving an index can be overcome 
if a competitor subsidizes escape.209 Costs are likely to be high to tip Libor, 
given the need to renegotiate six million home mortgages. However, another 
205. Craig Pirrong, Bund for Glory, or, It 's a Long Way to Tip a Market at 3 (Feb. 23, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=672504 ("Theory predicts that financial markets are 
' tippy,' that is, that all trading volume tends to gravitate to a single trading venue."). 
206. Cf Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-in Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998); 
Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. 
REV. 479, 562-86 (1998). 
207. Telephone interview with John Grout, Policy and Technical Director, Association of 
Corporate Treasurers (Nov. 8, 2011) (stating that companies don't care about "the nth decimal point" of 
cost as long as they have a rate they understand). 
208. !d. 
209. See Pirrong, supra note 205 (German government bonds tipped from L!FFE to Eurex for 
about 3% of total costs); see also LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 74, at 138 ("Tipping occurs when 
a product subject to increasing returns generates sufficient momentum in market share that its 
domination of the market becomes inevitable."). 
43 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 30, 2013 
provider would have an incentive to enter if the benefits of tipping Libor were 
greater than these attendant costs? 10 Where indices operate as products, it does 
not appear that lock-in effects have been problematically strong. Vigorous 
competition between Dow Jones, S&P and others for index clients does not 
seem to have been inhibited by S&P's larger position. 
On the other hand, Libor, a byproduct index, does not directly generate 
significant fees from users. This means that Libor and other byproduct indices 
are less likely to be disciplined by competition than product indices. More 
generally, product index providers rely on users for revenue, but byproduct and 
public providers do not directly rely on fees fi·om the index. Therefore, the 
disciplining effect of market competition is both blunted for the latter types of 
indices and more acute for product indices. 
Whatever the incentive effects of the market on the provider, a second 
market solution exists insofar as users can craft contractual terms to protect 
themselves from problematic indices. Sophisticated lenders have long included 
so-called "market disruption" clauses to protect themselves from disruptions to 
the Libor rate?'' A contract might authorize the substitution of a new referent if 
an index becomes untenable. However, these clauses are typically hard to 
invoke
212 
and often require the agreement of a large majority of a banking 
syndicate.2 13 Even then, it may be necessary to prove that a market disruption 
has taken place.2 14 Use of these clauses has accordingly been rare. Prior to the 
LIBOR disruption, perhaps a half dozen of these clauses had ever been 
invoked.215 Even the events implicated in In re Libor resulted in the invocation 
of very few of these clauses.2 16 
Contractors could negotiate more easily invoked disruption clauses for 
Libor or any other index, but counterpatties will worry that the index is only a 
2 10. Yet even the fee to tip Libor may not be prohibitively high. Mortgage brokers hawk 
refinancings every few years. If suitably encouraged, they could bring new indices as well as new prices. 
2 11. Financial Crisis Series: impact on Lom1s and Credit Markets, PRACTICAL LAw 
COMPANY (Feb 13, 2009), http:l/us.practicallaw.com/ 1-384-03 10. 
212. Wood, supra note 152, at 28 (noting that MDCs "were more habit-forming than useful"). 
213. Gray, supra note 153, at 3; Philip Rawlings, Market Dismption Clauses in Syndicated 
Loans, 24 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT. BANK & FIN. L. 447,449 (2009). 
214. See, e.g., Case C-8/08, T-Mobi1e Netherlands BV v. Raad van besttlllr van de 
Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, 2009 0.1. C 180, 12 (invoking clause); Market Disruption Clauses, 
BAKER & MCKENZIE 2 (Oct. 3 1, 2008), http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/ Publ ication/42a752c4-
2c8 1-42ab-828d-50c9f91 18cb3/Presentation/ PublicationAttachment/350636f4-4028-4e62-a089-
5285c7cOcf78/al_marketdismptionclauses_oct08.pdf(discussing difficulties with invoking clause). 
2 15. Gray, supra note 153, at 4. 
2 16. Loan Agreement: Borrowing Mechanics, PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY, 
http://us.practicallaw.com/3-383-671 7 ("However, Lenders rarely invoke this right because .. .. They 
may not want to jeopardize their relationship with the borrower."); A. David Reynolds, Dismptions in 
the LIBOR Market: Borrowers Beware When the Boile1plate is Broken, PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY 
(June 8, 2009), http:!/us.practicallaw.com/4-386-1075. This is perhaps to be expected; the boilerplate 
that gave rise lo dismption clauses was drafted to address index disappearance, not manipulation. Wood, 
supra note 152, at 18 ("The London Interbank Eurodollar market was only a few years old, and 
therefore banks considered that it might be vulnerable to disappearance."). 
44 
Index Theory 
temporary measure in the contract and that the real price term is the substitute 
term.217 Worse yet, contracting to set the substitution conditions, or litigating 
their use, creates transaction costs of the sort that indices were selected to 
. . 218 
avotd. 
Another limitation to contracting for disruption clauses is the difficulty of 
detecting profitable index manipulations. Index manipulation will often be hard 
to detect and still harder to prove. The scale of use of any of the major indices 
is measured in the trillions of dollars. Even a small adjustment in value could 
result in millions of dollars of gains over a short period of time. Although the 
absolute wealth transfer will be large, the index number itself may only deviate 
slightly, and may appear to be well within the range of ordinary price 
fluctuations. Thus, many contractors will not know when to invoke a 
contractual protection, negotiate for them, or shop for another index. 
Most importantly, however, the disciplining force of market competition 
is currently limited because of underproduction. As a public good, indices will 
often not exist in sufficient number for robust competition to have its salutary 
effects. Hence, market solutions are unlikely to solve all index problems, but 
are proportionately more effective where product indices are able to capture 
large revenues. 
2. Enforcement 
Enforcement, by which we mean private, administrative, and criminal 
adjudication, plays a role in preventing and remedying index problems, 
patticularly for product indices. In re Libor now involves plenty of pending 
enforcement. In that class-action lawsuit, interim counsel has been appointed 
for two classes of aggrieved investors including the City of Baltimore, pension 
funds, hedge funds, and individual investors alleging either that they purchased 
or sold Libor-based assets in the over-the-counter market, such as swaps, or on 
an exchange such as Eurodollar futures, respectively? 19 The facts allege that 
the plaintiffs either sold assets at depressed prices, such as Eurodollar futures, 
or held assets at decreased revenues, such as an interest rate swap. 
The resulting legal claims invoke a vast collection of laws: the Shern1an 
Act;220 equivalent state law antitrust laws;221 federal securities laws/22 state 
217. Raw lings, supra note 2 13, at 449 (reporting that borrowers may be resistant to market 
dismption clauses that may override the index term too readily, particularly if invocation of the term is 
difficult to dispute); see also JlG Capital LLC v. Van Der Merwe & Anor, (2008] EWCA {Civ) 542 
(litigating the certifica tion of amount due under guarantee). 
218. See, e.g., IJG Capital LLC v. Van Der Merwe & Anor, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 542 ; see 
also Verstein, supra note 47 (showing that the bene fi ts are reduced when contractual principals must 
monitor their specifying agents, including indices). 
219. See sources cited supra note 16. The Charles Schwab Fund family is suing separately. 
See Complaint, Schwab Money Market Fund v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 3: 11-cv-04186-MEJ (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 23, 20 I I) (hereinafter Schwab MMF Complaint]. 
220. Schwab MMF Complaint ,!~ 93-99 (citing 15 U.S.C. § I (20 12)). 
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. . I 223 224 l 22s _ ~ . . securities aws; state torts; state contract aws; state U1ua1r busmess 
practice laws/26 state fraud laws;227 the Racketeer Influenced and Comtpt 
Organizations Act (RIC0);228 and manipulation in violation of the Commodity 
Exchange Act.229 Criminal, antitrust, and securities agencies from half a dozen 
countries have subpoenaed and, in some cases, already punished panel 
banks.230 
Optimal deterrence often involves forcing actors to internalize the social 
costs of their behavior. Imposing litigation costs upon product providers will 
often encourage best practices. Product providers have a robust revenue stream 
associated with their index. As profit seekers, these providers will try to lower 
costs, including enforcement-related costs. Threatened with liability for 
negligent or intentional mismanagement of an index, many product providers 
will be deterred from wrongdoing. 
Optimal deterrence tlll'ough enforcement is unlikely in cases of byproduct 
indices like Libor, highlighting the limits of enforcement. It is far more difficult 
to use enforcement to discipline a byproduct index provider because any 
credible enforcement activity may lead to over-deterrence and exacerbate 
underproduction. This is because enforcement imposes on providers the social 
costs of their indices, but byproduct indices do not directly capture the social 
benefits of their indices. The potential costs of index dysfunction being 
22 1. /d.,.~ 203-09. 
222. ld. ~,1 117-28 (citing Securities Act of 1933 § II, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012) (civil liability 
for false registration statement)); id. , 129-37 (citing Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 
771(a)(2) (2012) (civil liability for omission or untme statement of material fact)); id. ~~ 138-41 (citing 
Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (20 12) (liability of persons controlling anyone liable under 
§ 77k or § 771)); id. 'ft 142-5 1 (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § I O(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) 
(20 12), and S.E.C. Rule I Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 Ob-5 (prohibiting manipulative and deceptive devices 
in connection with purchase or sale of security)); id. 'If~ 152-54 (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
§ 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012) (controlling person liability)). 
223. /d.~~ 185-89 (citing CAL. CORP. CODE§§ 25400-01 (civil liability for false or misleading 
statements or omissions in connections with securities sale)). 
224. Amended Class Action Complaint 'If~ 143-45, Metzler lnv. GmbH v. Credit Suisse, No. 
11-MD-2262 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2011) (hereinafter Metzler Complaint) (tortious interference with 
contractual relation); Schwab MMF Complaint, supra note 220, ~~ I 00- 104 (interference with economic 
advantage under California law). 
225. Schwab MMF Complaint ~,! 190-95 (breach of implied covenant of good fa ith); id. ~~ 
196-202 (unjust enrichment); Metzler Complaint, supra note 224, 11 136-42 (breach of contract). 
226. Schwab MMF Complaint, supra note 220, ~~ 105-108 (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 
17200). 
227. !d. 'li'll 109-16 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1572, 1709, 1710 (fraud, deceit and 
concealment)). 
228. /d. 'li'li 155-84 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (20 12) (prohibiting participation in 
racketeering activity)). 
229. Metzler Complaint, supra note 224, ~ 115-2 1 (alleging defendants caused artificial prices 
on CME, a contract market) (citing 7 U.S.C. §§ I et seq. (2012)). 
230. Cf Lindsay Whipp, Tokyo watchdog imposes two sanctions on Citi, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 16, 
20 II, 5:37 PM), http://www.ft.com/intllcms/s/0/645da6a2-27d6-ll e l-a4c4-00 144feabdc0.html (stating 
that Japan 's Financial Services Agency imposed sanctions on Citi after finding that Citi staff had 
attempted to manipulate Libor and Tibor in order to benefit trading positions). 
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astronornical,231 even honest firms may face substantial litigation expenses 
from meritless lawsuits.232 With no index-related revenue, a byproduct provider 
may decide that providing an index costs more than it contributes to whatever 
primary activity the index was a byproduct of. Certain Libor panel banks have 
already withdrawn in the wake of litigation.
233 
Moreover, when enforcement does not over-deter, it may under-deter, 
because of the practical difficulties of credible punishment. It will generally be 
hard to detect and prove manipulation, and establish damages;
234 
it is especially 
hard for byproduct indices like Libor, which util ize non-verifiable, proprietary 
data rather than the public data used in product indices like S&P 500. Index 
disruptions of the sort noted in In re Libor may have many causes, and 
enormous profits can be reaped within the realm of statistically insignificant 
error. 
After proof, there comes punishment. To cause the perpetrators to make 
victims whole would be an appropriate but devastating remedy. The Financial 
Times described the potential liability from Libor enforcement as "too 
catastrophic to impose."235 The cost of a penalty could easily bankrupt many 
index providers. 
This problem is more severe for byproduct indices because, by definition, 
the provider has some other line of business that enables the index. Three 
quarters of the USD Libor panel contributors are Globally Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions (SIFis), and almost half of the global SIFis are 
USD Libor panel banks?36 Especially during a financial crisis, it may be 
unrealistic to punish such providers at the risk of their collapse. Enforcement 
can only deter if its threats are credible, but it may be too costly to fully punish 
231. Libor Penalty, supra note 20 (noting that Libor manipulation damage could have come to 
$1 trillion). 
232. More than a dozen finns have been sued in in re Libor. Consolidated Amended 
Complaint, in re Libor, No. I: 11-md-02262, 2012 WL 1522306 (S.D.NY Apr. 30, 20 12_). If only a few 
banks were involved in the Libor disruption, then the other firms have mcurred substantial defense fees 
by association. 
233. Whipp, supra note 230; Stanley Carvalho and David French, Exclusive: Libor Scandal 
Forces Bm'C!ays From UAE Rate Panel-Sources, REUTERS (July 15, 2012, 8:43 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/20 12/07/15/us-banking-libor-eibor-idUSBRE86E03N20 120715. . 
Enforcement could harm product production too, if liability attaches to data providers. Argus, a prov1der 
akin to Platts, argued that new CFTC enforceme?t rules "may ~nnecessa~ily . ch~ll t~.e vol~~t?ry 
submission of transaction related data by market part1c1pants to compilers of pnce md1ces. Proh1b1t1on 
on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Prohi~it~on 
on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 4 1,408 (July 14, 20 11) (promulgating final rules, and descnbmg 
comments received). 
234. See Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Revolution in 
Manipulation Law: The New CFTC Rules and the Urgent Need for Economic and Empirical Analysis, 
15 U. PA. J. Bus. L. (forthcoming 20 12) (describing the use of screens in pleading). 
235. Libor Penalty, supra note 20. 
236. Thirteen out of twenty-eight global SIFis are panel banks, and thirteen out of eighteen 
panel banks are global S!Fis. See Update of Group of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-S(Bs), 
FIN. STABILITY BOARD (Nov. I, 20 12), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publicallons/ 
r_121031ac.pdf. 
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index providers who provide other important services. By contrast, a monoline 
product index might be made to buckle under the weight of liability without 
compromising the broader financial system. 
When the expected cost of enforcement is high, product providers may 
improve their indices to avoid credible threats of punishment. By contrast 
punishment may not be credible against byproduct indices, which may be 
spared the rod if their primary product is socially important. Even when 
punishment is credible, byproduct providers may sometimes find it cheaper to 
stop providing the index than to improve it. In either case, the difficulties of 
detection and proof limit the power of enforcement. Ideally, enforcement would 
be supplemented by other solutions and by structural improvements intended to 
make indices more appropriately responsive to enforcement. 
3. Governance 
Good index governance can reduce the risk of index malproduction and 
manipulation, but there is no such thing as a free lunch. Changes to index 
practices always create tradeoffs. With even the most attractive solutions 
creating costs, it may prove difficult for the government to mandate reforms. 
Consider six proposed reforms to BBA Libor as an example for how 
regulators might impose best practices for an index. F irst, it may seem that 
banks should submit their Libor quotes anonymously, so as to diminish any 
reputational motive for lowballing quotes. While such a change would reduce 
the reputational motivation for manipulation, it would increase the attraction of 
positional manipulation and rogue trading s ince it would be harder for the 
market to scrutinize bank quotes in terms of comparable data. 
Second, some banks seem to have allowed extensive interactions between 
the treasurers w ho set the Libor quote and the traders who bet on Libor.237 It 
may seem that the government should require banks to create a "Chinese wall" 
between these groups. Yet this is not obviously better. During the financial 
crisis, when bank borrowing was thin, determining banks' borrowing rates was 
difficult, and treasurers may have turned to traders as a source of valuable 
information on comparable metrics that might bear on the Libor quote. 
Such communications would be unnecessary if a third suggestion is 
adopted: indices like Libor could be based only on actual market transactions, 
rather than each treasurer' s subjective sense of what rate they could get.238 But 
some markets are thinly traded, particularly during a financial crisis. Libor is 
quoted in 15 maturities in ten currencies. Just what quantity does J.P. Morgan 
borrow, unsecured, in London, of Swedish krona, with an 11-month maturity, 
237. Li31n Vaughan & Katie Linsell, Libor FlaiVs AlloiVed Banks to Rig Rates Without 
Conspiracy , BLOOMBERG (Jul. 16, 2012, 5:46AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-16/libor-
naws-allowcd-banks-to-rig-ratcs-without-conspiracy.html . 
238. See Eavis & Popper, supra note 119 (quoting Chairman Gary Gens ler) . 
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on any given day at 11 a.m.? There may not be_an ~ctual ~arkct n:an_saction to 
substantiate the bank's dai ly quote, but a quote IS st1ll reqlllred. ~h1s IS becaus_e 
users-swap partic ipants in patticular- want to know the L1bor for theu· 
transactions. A rate limited to real transactions would be en·atic or blank with 
some frequency. 
Fourth, the government might go even further, banning those indices for 
which reliable market data is not always avai lable. The UK is expected to force 
d. h '·- 239 Libor to discontinue peculiar offerings like the 11-month Swe IS 1\.10na rate. 
Yet this substitutes malproduction for underproduction, and it is doubtful that 
the government is better positioned than market participants to decide which 
individual rates are better unproduced than produced alongside efforts to 
manage their risks. 
Fifth, it may seem that Libor panel banks should be barred fr~m also 
being Libor users?40 While it is tme that separating use an~ production may 
resolve conflicts of interest, this suggestion nevertheless 1msunderstands the 
economics of Libor. For byproduct indices, indirect revenue is the only revenue 
the index brings. Divestiture without some substitute revenue stream can only 
lead to underproduction. The banks created Libor almost thirty years ago so 
that they could use it. If they cannot use it, they may not incur the expense of 
. . . . 241 
mamtarnmg 1t. 
Sixth, and finally, submissions could be designed so that manipulation is 
more difficult or costly. For example, banks might be required to provide 
whatever data justifies their quote, or they might be required to accept trades or 
loans at whatever rate they quote. Then banks would be cautious at least to 
submit higher quotes, lest they be forced to borrow at a higher price. Both of 
these suggestions would make manipulation more costly, but could exacerbate 
underproduction s ince banks may not wish to re lease proprietary data or make a 
market for cash they do not want at that time. 
The point is not that these practices are inadvisable, only that it _is di~ficult 
for a third party to determine whether a practice is justified for a g1ven mdex 
and how each tradeoff should ideally be made. A government regulator 
imposing mles is arguably less likely to make the right d_ecisions h~re than_ a 
properly motivated provider of a product index. Product mdex prov1ders will 
generally have an incentive to operate in a manner that preserves the value of 
239. Gonzalo Vina, U.K. Will Implement Wheatley Plan for Libor Overhaul in Full, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 17, 2012, 11 :00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/20 12- 1 0-17/u-k-wlll-
implement-wheatley-plan-for -libor-overhaul-in-full-1-. html. 
240. See Liam Vaughan, Gavin Finch & Jesse Westbrook, Life as Libor Traders Knew It Seen 
as Abusive by Investigators, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2, 201 2, 3:32PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
20 12-03-02/1 ife-as-li bor-traders-knew-it-seen-as-abusive-by-colluston-tnvest tgators.html. Related ly, tt 
seems likely that index providers ought to have conflicts ~o.licies for their employees to prevent rogue 
trading, at a minimum, but the precise level and type of pohctes are hard to dtctate '.n the abstract. 
241. Peter Thai Larsen & Wayne Arnold, What if Banks Boycott L1bor?, REUTERS (July 17, 
2012, 4:41 PM), http:// in.reuters.com/articlel20 12/07117/idiNL4E81H I HU20 120717. 
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their product, so they may be expected to take governance seriously? 42 Even if 
the mandated governance does not make things worse, any business practice 
requirement limits the freedom of the provider to exercise its judgment and 
discretion, which are the essence of an index 's operation and the value it adds. 
Sometimes the government cannot avoid mandating governance- that is, 
when the government itself is the provider of a public index. Many users are 
afraid of government manipulation for political ends; the flight to Libor is 
partly attributable to banks' distrust of government controlled indices.243 In this 
~ase, insulated and professionalized indices may be better able to resist political 
mfluence and so enjoy greater legitimacy and utility_244 
In creating new public indices, the government may wish to co-opt other 
market actors in order to overcome infonnational deficits. Yet in order to do so 
the government would require adequate systems of oversight to make sure that 
it is not an unwitting abettor of manipulation. For example, the government 
could create a benchmark interest rate index based on Fedwire data to compete 
'th L'b 245 . WI 1 or. In an Important study, authors at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York compared Libor rates to the $2.6 trillion in daily transactions 
conducted through Fedwire, which is the Federal Reserve's interbank payment 
t 246 Th' ~ys em. IS same method could be used to construct an interbank lending 
mdex that would be resilient to political risks from the provider and also based 
on actual transactions. This is a promising avenue, though it has its own 
challenges. First, an actual-transaction index may disappoint users when there 
is no actual transaction upon which to report. Second, this strategy makes banks 
involuntary byproducers of the new index with no financial interest in its 
accuracy, and they may act strategically, such as engaging in transactions 
designed to manipulate the index.247 Any new public indices must be carefully 
protected from these perverse incentives. 
If the government is able to overcome governance risks, new public 
indices could be funded to help solve underproduction and to provide users 
with an alternative to existing product and byproduct indices. Public indices 
could provide competition to malproducing indices and help overcome 
underproduction. Still, it is implausible to rely totally on public provision for 
society's index needs. Good governance in index production can probably 
reduce index risks, but it is difficult to design efficient rules from the outside. 
_24_2. S&P, for example, mandates that their index committee members have no trading or sales 
role WJthm the fim1 or on their own account. Blitzer interview, supra note 115. 
243. Carsella, supra note 187, at 46. 
244. See STAPLEFORD, supra note 50, at 390-99. ft is beyond the scope of this paper to fully 
elab~rate how agencies can be designed to resist pressures, but a vast literature in political science, 
pubhc cho1ce, and economics confronts these questions. 
245. Kuo, Skeie & Vickery, supra note 4. 
246. ld. at 5; see also Fedwire Funds Service-Annual, FED. RES. BOARD, 
http:/~\~Ww.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedfunds_ann.htm (last updated Aug. 10, 20 12) 
(prov1dmg Fed wire data). 
247. See supra Subsections 11.C.2 & 3. 
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Providers of product indices have a greater interest in finding credible 
methodologies and so may be able to design their own good governance more 
readily than may byproduct providers. 
B. The Law of Intellectual Property and Unjust Enrichment 
Market, enforcement, and governance responses are solutions to some 
index risks, but their effectiveness is limited when most of the indices come 
from byproduct and public providers. In this Section, however, we argue that 
the most promising response to the risk of index manipulation is also the best 
way to manage the risks of index underproduction and malproduction. This 
solution involves reforming the intellectual property law that governs financial 
indices, so as to optimize market participants' incentives for index production. 
Although all three index types serve important functions, byproduct 
indices are prone to special risks, such as conflicts of interest. Product indices 
are not without their own risks, but their profit motive often makes them more 
responsive to their customers' needs and the law's sanctions. Yet, in recent 
years, courts have increasingly forced product indices to migrate to a 
byproduction model. Part I of this section describes that forced transition by 
analyzing recent developments in the law governing indices. 
Part 2 urges reform. Financial indices should regain a degree of property 
protection similar to that which they enjoyed a decade ago and which served 
well since the early 1980s. Moreover, those substantive rights should be 
supported on a new doctrinal basis. Rather than returning to the state law 
doctrines that previously played the role, we should consider tailoring a federal 
regime for financial indices. Such a regime would do more than allow existing 
product indices to continue their business; it would pe1mit many byproduct 
indices to become product indices if they deemed it more efficient. And even 
those that retained their byproduct model would enjoy stronger incentives to 
manage their operations responsibly. 
1. State Law Misappropriation 
For decades, product index providers were able to rely on state common 
law to protect their indices. Today, though, courts are increasingly finding that 
the Federal Copyright Act preempts state law index protections, but provides 
none of its own. This section shows that state-law index property protections 
are doctrinally insecure and theoretically confused because they rest on a 
flawed analogy between index providers and newsgatherers. Worse yet, the rise 
of an equally flawed analogy- indices as securities-is rapidly eroding the few 
property protections indices currently possess. 
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i. Indices as "Hot News" 
Index providers generally possess the right to control use of their index 
and its output value. Both property r ights find support in the landmark case 
Standard & Poor 's Corp. v. Commodity Exchange, Inc. (Comex 1).248 There, 
Commodity Exchange, Inc. (Comex) developed a futures contract called the 
"Comex 500 Stock Index" that "essentially duplicate[d] the S&P 500."249 
Comex allowed users to trade futures contracts on the Comex 500, despite 
S&P's refusal to grant it a license and without paying S&P any fees. The court 
of appeals held that Comex had misappropriated S&P's property? 50 Similarly, 
in Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Company, Inc. 
(CB01),25 t the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that index providers may prevent 
users from creating contracts settled based on an index, even if users are 
licensees of the index data. 
These cases are the foundation of contemporary index producers' property 
rights, and the bas is of Dow Jones, S&P and MSCI's indexing business. Yet 
from the begitming, index rights were problematic due to their characterization 
as quasi-intellectual property akin to news. Both the Comex I and CBOT courts 
grounded their decisions in the "hot news doctrine", which orig inates in 
International News Service v. Associated Press (INS), a 90-year-old Supreme 
Court decision finding that International News Service, by speedily publishing 
stories based on fresh news gathered by other news companies rather than 
sending their own reporters out for a scoop, had committed tortious 
misappropriation.252 INS upheld a quasi-intellectual property right in certain 
information because of the effort that went into its acquisition, and because of 
the unfairness of taking information acquired by others and selling it at a lower 
cost.253 
There is a certain intuitive appeal to thinking of indices as news. Index 
outputs are information, like news, which can produce benefits from wide 
d issemination. Index providers have a journalistic character both in the manner 
that they acquire infonnation and in their historical ties to news agencies.254 
248. Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982) (Comex 1), affd, 683 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1982) (Comex II). 
249. Comex I, 538 F. Supp. at1069. 
250. Comex II, 683 F.2d at 711. 
25 l. 456 N.E.2d 84 (Ill. 1983). 
252. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). See also U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. McGraw 
Hill Cos., 390 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that Platts has a First Amendment "repOiter's 
privilege'' to its proprietary data and vetting techniques). 
253. !d. at 245 (explaining that the injunction "restrains any taking or gainfully using of the 
complainant's news, either bodily or in substance, from bulletins issued by the complainant or any of its 
members, or from editions of the ir newspapers, ' until its commercial value as news to the complainant 
and all of its members has passed away."'). 
254. For example, Dow Jones retains the Editor-in-Chief of the Wall Street Journal on the 
board of its index committee; FTSE's first two letters stand for Financial Times, its founder and 
erstwhile 50 percent owner. 
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Still, INS is a poor foundation for the property rights of indices. First, the 
case is no longer binding federal law, as it was based on federal common-law 
reasoning abandoned in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.
255 
Second, while INS 
remains influential under state law, recent Second C ircuit decisions have 
dangerously narrowed its applicability, ruling that it is preempted by federal 
. f . . 256 Th t copyright law except m a narrow range o circumstances. e mos 
important recent case to address INS is Barclays Capital Inc, v. 
Thejlyonthewall.com (Fly), in which the Second Circuit near-fatally narrowe.d 
the doctrinal bas is for index rights as well as exposing the ill-conceived basts 
· · . h d I t d 257 upon which mdex property protectiOn a ong res e . 
The defendant in Fly ("Fly") obtained research reports that fmancial finns 
like Barclays sent to customers, and then rapidly summarized the investment 
recommendations for Fly's own customers. Fly could provide the essence of 
the repmt and recommendations for a price that d id not reflect the bank's 
production costs. The buy and sell recommendations of major investment ba~s 
tend to move markets, and the initial possessors of those repmts can benefit 1f 
they can act on a recommendation before it becomes widely known .. By 
publicizing the report to a broader base before the market opens, Fly depnved 
the banks' clients of that benefit. Among other things, this reduced the 
incentive for customers to maintain relationships with Barclays and pay 
commissions on trades. Put simply, Fly's business model was to free-ride on 
large banks' research. 
Yet the Second Circuit found no free-riding and ruled for Fly. Widely 
acknowl~dged as marking the death of INS/ 58 Fly explicitly relegated the "h<:_>t 




INS's progeny, to the realm of d icta?60 The court declared that " Fly is not, 
under NBA's analysis, ' free-riding,"'26 t primarily because " [i]t is collecting, 
collating and disseminating factual infonnation - the facts that Firn1s and 
255. Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc .. 650 F.3d 876, 894 (2d Cir. 20 11) 
(Fly) (noting that JNS represented federal common law, which was largely abandoned in Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). 
256. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, "Hot News": 1'l1e Enduring Myth of Property in News, I II 
COLUM. L. REV. 419 (2011). While generally critical of INS, Balganesh's sophisticated analysis of the 
hol-news doctrine appreciates that the doctrine is an attempt to solve a collective action problem. 
257 . 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 20 II). 
258. See. e.g. Derek Bambauer, Flyonthewa/1 Not Squashed, INFO/LAW (June 2 1, 2.01 1), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/20 11/06/2 1/flyonthewall-not-squashed ("The case smartly mters 
INS v. AP, the turgid Supreme Court case that generated the "hot news" .m~sappropriation tort."); 
Camille Caiman and Robert D. Balin, The Future of the Hot News Misappropnalwn Tori After Barc!O)'S 
Capital Inc. v. TheF/yontheWall.com, MEDIA LAW MON.tTOR (Sept. 16, 2011), 
http :l/www. media lawmoni tor.eom/20 I 1/09/the-future-of-the-hot-news-misappropnatl on-tort-after-
barclays-capital-inc-v-theflyonthewall-com ("There seems lillie doubt lhat the hot news doctnne has 
suffered a serious blow in the Second Circuit."). 
zs• 1 05F.3d 84 1 (2d Cir. 1997) (NBA). 
260. Fly, 650 F.3d at 899-900 (citing NBA, 105 F.3d at 852). 
261. !d. at 902. 
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others in the securities business have made recommendations .... "262 The 
court treated the banks' recommendations exclusively as facts, and the 
intellectual property rights in facts are not readily awarded: "The Firms are 
making the news; Fly ... is breaking it. "263 Of course INS had provided quasi-
intellectual property rights in facts, but the Fly court read INS protections very 
nanowly. For example, " hot news" protection requires direct competition, but 
the court found that the banks and Fly were not competitors. The plaintiffs 
offered brokerage services, whereas Fly reported on recommendations. The 
court was unconcerned that Fly marketed brokerage services to its customers 
that did compete with the banks, the economic equivalent of direct 
competition?64 
Fly is clearly a problematic precedent for index rights. It diminishes the 
precedential power of INS, upon which index rights cunently rest. It applies 
INS and its progeny so nanowly that there is little hope of an index provider 
taking shelter in it. For example, the direct-competition requirement would 
prevent a competitor from creating and licensing a copycat index identical to 
the S&P 500 since both companies would then be in the index-licensing 
business. But it would not seem to prevent a competitor from using the S&P 
500 in derivatives or funds, which it then offered to the public, since product 
creation is a different line of business. Yet these unauthmized products would 
compete with the index provider's licensees, who might prefer to buy the 
copycat product rather than license the real thing. These are the exact facts of 
Comex I, and if Fly's direct competition requirement had been applied there, 
providers' property rights might never have been recognized. 
Perhaps the most dangerous element of Fly is not what it changes from 
prior precedents, but what it explicitly maintains: INS protected hard work, not 
discretion or judgment. The Fly court did not find INS-type hard work, since 
"[i]n pressing a ' hot news' claim against Fly, the Finns seek only to protect 
their Recommendations, something they create using their e~ertise and 
experience rather than acquire through efforts akin to reporting."2 5 Expertise, 
experience, reflection and judgment, the court held, were not "effort" akin to 
reporting, and therefore the plaintiffs did not invest the proper kind of work 
into producing their reports. 
Fly thus illustrates the limits of the newsgathering analogy. The court's 
reasoning accurately reflects INS's 90-year obsession with hard work in 
investigation rather than expertise in judgment. Every major decision 
concerning indices has cited INS and followed it in emphasizing investment of 
262. !d. 
263. !d. 
264. !d. at 904. 




labor rather than creativity.266 But effort-based protections for indices become 
less plausible as the cost of indexing drops through scalable technology. 
Although S&P spends a great deal to be in the index business, the marginal cost 
of an additional index has become quite low, and many of its inputs are public 
prices requiring little investigative effort?67 Many indices are produced as 
byproducts, so it is hard to attribute cost and effort directly to their production. 
Most importantly, the value of indices is about judgment and discretion in 
precisely the ways that courts from INS to Fly have excluded from hot news 
protection. The utility of an index's methodology, output value, and data stems 
not from the sweat that went into producing it, but from the well-exercised 
judgment of its provider. 
ii. Indices as Securities 
As the strained analogy to news weakens, taking index protections with it, 
another bad analogy has arisen that prevents the protection of index property 
claims in the first place. Courts seem to imagine that an index provider is like a 
fmn that has gone public, and that index values, once licensed, are like ordinary 
securities. This baffling view has caused indices to lose key legal battles, and 
with them, providers' property rights. 
Foremost among these cases is Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. International 
Securities Exchange, lnc.268 There, defendant ISE created, listed, and facilitated 
the trading of options on shares of an exchange traded fund ("ETF") that, in 
turn, tracked the Dow Jones Industrial Average. The dispute concerned whether 
unauthorized index derivatives trading amounted to misappropriation from the 
creator of the index.
269 
The plaintiffs claims would seem to be similar to those 
in CBOT and Comex I and therefore likely to prevail. 
The court found for ISE and against the plaintiff on the ground that 
defendant had created options on an ETF and not on the index itself. The index 
provider may have a right to withhold its proprietary fonnulas from users, but 
"[b ]y authorizing the creation of ETFs using their proprietary formulas, and the 
sale of the ETF shares to the public, the plaintiffs [] relinquished any right to 
control resale and public trading of those shares. "270 
266. See Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982); McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc. v. lnt'l Sec. Exch., l.nc., No. 05 Civ.I 129(HB), 2005 WL 21005I8 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. I, 2005), aff'd sub nom. Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. lnt'l Sec. Exch., lnc., 451 F.3d 295 
(2d Cir. 2006); see also Chicago Bd. of Options Exch., Inc. v. lnt'l Sec. Exch., LLC, No. 06-Cl-1-24798, 
at 14 (111. Cir. Ct. July 8, 2010) (citing INS's progeny as "the source from which Illinois 
misappropriation law arose."). 
267. Telephone interview with Alex Matturri, CEO of S&P Dow Jones Indices (Dec. 19, 
20 1 I) (asserting that anyone with a spreadsheet and a data stream can be in the index business). 
268. 451 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2006). 
269. ld. at 302 ("Plaintiffs have invested time, money, and intellectual creativity into the 
creation and maintenance of their indexes. Each argues !hat this gives it an intellecntal-property right in 
the index itsel f, as well as in an ETF that tracks the index, and in options on shares of such an ETF."). 
270. !d. at 303. 
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The court posited that an option is merely a particular, conditional form of 
trading securities, and vendors or issuers lack the tight to constrain the trading 
of securities once released. In so holding, the court followed Golden Nugget, 
Inc. v. American Stock Exchange, Inc. , where an exchange-listed corporation 
sought to block the exchange from trading options on its stock.271 The Ninth 
Circuit declared that the trading of such options could not be constrained.272 
The reasoning of Dow Jones allows anyone to circumvent the property 
rights recogn ized in Comex I and CBOT. Dow Jones permits competitors to 
write an option whose value is determined by the value of shares of an S&P 
500 index fund. Such an option will have essentially identical payout as 
verboten options on the index itself. Since nearly all index providers license 
their index for use in some fund or derivative, and since courts see no reason to 
afford those securities any special treatment under law, the market has become 
free to create the economic equivalent of licensed index products without ever 
paying a licensing fee.273 Decisions like Dow Jones cast the future of product 
. d" . d" 274 m tees mto tsarray. 
ii i. Consequences of Declining Property Protetion 
The stakes are high for index providers who have a business model that 
depends upon charging market participants for use of their financial products. 
An index provider that is unable to control use of its index in derivatives cannot 
charge for such use. Unlike a company that will still issue shares, such an index 
has been denuded of significant revenue and may cease production. The 
implications of cases like Dow Jones are crucial for the financial viability of 
index production: "Since ETF options are among the most actively traded 
derivative contracts in the U.S., it is estimated that this result cost index 
licensors tens of tnillions of dollars in annual revenue."275 
T he trend in recent case law has been to diminish index property rights, 
dangerously undermining the incentives for product index providers to produce 
future indices, manage extant indices well, and prevent index problems. 
Already, product index providers are a diminishing pack. Concern for 
weakening property rights has led to a wave of mergers in the index 
27 1. Golden Nugget, Inc. v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc., 828 F.2d 586 (9th CiL 1987) 
272. !d. at 59 1. 
273. See, e.g ., Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc. v. Archipelago Holdings, LLC, 336 F. Supp. 2d 294, 
303-04 (S .D.N.Y. 2004) (rejecting Nasdaq's suit to prevent Archipelago from facilitating unauthorized 
trades of shares of a Nasdaq-affiliated ETF). 
274. Dow Jones fo llows Fly's direct competition requirement in raising form over economic 
substance. Both disallow one transaction as misappropriation while allowing an economically equivalent 
one. 
275. Neal Wolkoff, Changes At The Exchanges, J. INDEXES, Jan./Feb. 2007, 
http://www.indexuniverse.corn/publications/joumalofindexes/joi-articles/2630.html. Indexing is a global 
business, and index property has been even more resoundingly limited in impm1ant European 
jurisdictions. Commerzbank v. Deutsche Borse, (20 I 0] E.T.M.R. 3 1. 
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business.276 Exchanges may buy indices because they fear that product index 
providers may be unable to dependably provide indices if they cannot charge a 
l.icense fee. Buying the provider will ensure an exchange access to the basis of 
its exchange-traded options. But such a merger ultimately represents a move 
from product to byproduct index. They therefore carry risks of malproduction 
and manipulation in the form of conflicts of interest and competition concerns, 
which are likelier for byproduct indices. 
Some providers may adapt to weakened property rights by refusing to 
disclose aspects of their index that others might copy, keeping more and more 
products in-house. However, the tradeoff in information is rarely between 
intellectual property rights and a commons.277 Rather, firn1s will resort to 
secrecy if publicity dissipates the value of their infotmation, even though 
secrecy is often socially wasteful. In the index world, this is partly expressed 
through fund managers campaigning to run their own indices.278 Secretive, in-
house indices may reduce market transparency and increase agency problems 
for investors. 
279 
The creation of indices within funds also represents a tnigration 
from product to byproduct production as an index is taken in-house to serve 
fund purposes. 
2. Restoring Property 
Reversing the trend of eroding index property rights would slow adverse 
changes in the market, as well as provide a path for existing byproduct 
providers to adopt a product model. A llowing providers to directly internalize 
the benefits they create may help solve the implicit collective action problem of 
indices as public goods. 
To provide some perspective, the global notional value indexed to Libor 
exceeds $350 trillion. The vast majority of users do not pay any licensing fee to 
the BBA for the use of BBA Libor as a settlement price. If BBA were able to 
charge 3 basis points, or 0.03%, of notional value as an annual fee to its present 
derivatives users, the result would be about $100 billion in annual revenue.280 
$ 100 billion is a large sum of money, even in tenns of global finance. 
276. Telephone interview with Alex Matturri, Chief Executive Officer of S&P Dow Jones 
Indices (Dec. 19, 20 11). 
277. Edmund M. Ki tch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 
275-80 (1977). 
278. See supra notes 146-1 50 and accompanying text. 
279. Compefition and exclusivity of license are compatible. ETF fees are structured as a cost 
to the fund manager, and so we are less worried in this case about the failures of competition in the fund 
industry. See generally Jon Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously, Why Governance and 
Fee Litigation Don't Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84 (2010) (describing the possibilities and 
limits of competition to constrain fees). 
funds. 
280. S&P 500 licensees' funds pay more than 3 bps for the right to track the S&P in their 
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Able to see the explicit value of the BBA Libor index, BBA and the panel 
banks might treat the index like a product.281 They would have adequate 
incentives to prevent indexing risks, investing in governance and systems to 
prevent employee manipulation. If the disturbances were reputational, the 
banks would have to weigh reputational effects against .the damage to a 
valuable revenue stream. Even in the turmoil of a crisis, such revenue would 
not be risked lightly. 
Stronger intellectual property amounts to promoting the growth of product 
indices and the migration of byproduct indices to a product model. For 
example, if Libor were more trustworthy and valuable as an independent entity 
from the bank's primary business, they might spin it off to an independent 
indexing firm with which they have a contract to share data. 
Some amount of malproduction and underproduction can come from a 
product index provider's market power.282 However, their risks are often better 
managed than those of byproduct indices. Product indices are more responsive 
to market forces than are byproduct indices. Moreover, the licensing fees would 
be sufficiently attractive to encourage competitors, drawing more participants 
into the field . Although it is costly to transition loan and swap parties to a new 
index, a $ 1 00 billion annual revenue stream could be large enough for a 
competitor to compensate users for the difficulty of overcoming lock-in.283 
We are aware that our emphasis on property rights bucks the trend in 
intellectual property circles, which increas ingly criticize propertization? 84 A 
full treatment of the efficacy or nonnative defensibility of the U.S. intellectual 
property regime is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that 
financial index providers have special reasons for property protection that 
largely sidesteps that debate. First, infamous holdup opportunities are not 
present here. It is unlikely that indices serve as crucial building blocks in any 
context except as components of the financial derivatives or funds based upon 
them. They are therefore unlikely to stack or inhibit innovation.285 
Second, index providers are more sympathetic recipients of ongoing 
property protection because of indices' dependence upon their creators' 
continuing efforts. A company's logo, an artist' s painting, and an inventor' s 
281. Presumably, BBA would share revenues with the panel banks it represents in order to 
support and encourage their honest submissions. 
282. Propertization can also fail to account for "spillover" benefits to third parties. See 
generally BREIT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: TH E SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 
(20 12) (arguing that infrastructure resources should be managed as commons rather than privately 
owned). 
283. See supra Subsection II.D. I. 
284. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of 
information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245 (2003) (urging commons production); Steven Shavell & Tanguy van 
Ypersele, Rewards Versus intellectual Properly Rig/us, 44 J.L. & ECON 525 (200 I) (urging prizes). 
285. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 




invention each remains useful even if their creators abandon them. Because 
these extant goods can be expected to persist, intellectual property law may 
balance the competing interests of the rresent distribution of those goods 
against future production of new goods.28 By contrast, the value of a financial 
index requires continuing effort from its creator to update the methodology and 
apply it. If Standard & Poor's exits the index business, the public does not 
simply lose out on future index innovation; existing indices will instantly 
disappear. The benefits of intellectual property for dynamic efficiency are 
usually opposed to reductions in static efficiency; by contrast, static efficiency 
often urges index prioritization too. 
Third, we have already seen much of the result of this proposal, and it was 
unobjectionable. Though this proposal does urge a change of, and increase in, 
property rights in this space, it mostly urges a project of retrieval and doctrinal 
clarification. The index market functioned satisfactorily for decades. Recent 
legal changes have resulted in undesirable market trends, and so we urge 
undoing those changes. This is unlike other areas of intellectual property where 
increased propertization constitutes a novel change, and one associated with 
known problems. 
Our present purpose is to urge greater propertization, not to define the 
contours of the optimal intellectual property regime for financial indices.287 It 
must suffice to note some of the features of a proposed regime. First, index 
property rights must be secured with federal, not state, law. This is in part 
because of the mismatch in protections offered under state law, the focus on the 
"sweat of the brow," which fails to appreciate and protect the creativity of the 
indexing process. 288 Further, if the erosion of state misappropriation doctrine 
were reversed, the resulting regime might protect far more than just financial 
indices, a result that this proposal cannot be taken to justify. Finally, interstate 
diversity in index property is inappropriate given the national character of 
indices and index use. 
Within the federal regime, there is no perfect fit under existing options. 
Therefore, a sui generis treatment, akin to that of mask works289 and boat 
hulls,290 may be appropriate.291 This is in part because indices have at least 
286. Scholars have long described this tradeoff as between "dynamic" and "static" efficiency. 
Compare Harold Demsetz, l!!formation and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. I, 14 
(1969), with Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE 
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 623 (Nat'! 
Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962). See generally Amy Kopczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How 
to Gel Beyond Intellectual Properly lntemalism, 59 UCLA L. REv. 970, 981-93 (20 12) (describing I he 
debate). 
287. In ongoing research, we are exploring the relationships among financial information, 
financial indices, and intellectual property. 
288. See supra Subsection III.B.l.i. 
289. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 30 I , 98 Stat. 3347 
(1984) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 90 1-14). 
290. Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, Pub. L. 105-304, §§ 501-{)2, 11 2 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-32) 
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three protectable components . Federal trademark law protects the name of the 
index, but there is also an output value and an input methodology to protect. 
Federal copyright law attaches to creativity, and could have been applied to 
financial indices had courts not been influenced by the myth of objectivity. But 
even copyright law could protect only the output of the index, not its inputs. 
The methodology for producing the index, which producers license to 
investment funds, would require non-copyright treatment.292 One option would 
be a business methods patent, although cases like Bilsky have curtailed the 
scope of patent protection for business methods.293 In any case, the limited 
duration of either copyright or patent implies that at some point the protection 
of the index will expire and copying will be permitted- but it is not obvious 
that index providers should ever surrender their property interest in the index 
they consistently maintain and innovate. 
To be clear, our proposal does not urge property to the exclusion of other 
modes of production, such as government subsidy or peer-production. Those 
modes of production exist in the public and byproduct models, which 
demonstrate their own distinct risks and competencies. Our exploration of 
property is warranted because there is little reason to believe those models will 
always be superior to a product model, particularly when property is paired 
with appropriate limitations. 
For instance, fair-use exceptions to property rights would protect many of 
the functions indices serve and from which it would be inefficient to exclude 
users. No one should have to pay to explain that their investment beat the S&P 
500's returns. But it is unlikely that any index provider would attempt to 
prevent such uses of the index anyway; they benefit from the index's fame.294 
For commercial users, it may be appropriate for the SEC to adopt a compulsory 
licensing regime that forbids exclusive dealings between a provider and a 
0 1 d d 295 'k 0 smg e pro uct ven or. Steps It e thts can reduce the costs of property. 
29 1. Sui generis regimes have been subject to criticism, e.g., David Nimmer, Codi}jling 
Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1327-1331 (2004), but may nevertheless be the best 
option given the concerns addressed. 
292. The United States generally does not recognize copyrights in databases or compilations. 
See Feist Publ 'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (199 1). But see CCC Info. Servs. v. 
Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing copyright protection for 
compilation of automobile prices). Morever, it is not clear that database protection would be useful here. 
Germany has database rights, but s till affords indices few protections. 
293. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 32 18 (2010). 
294. Telephone interview with Alex Matturri, Chief Executive Officer of S&P Dow Jones 
Indices (Dec. 19, 20 II ). 
295. S.E.C. Rule 19c-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-5 (20 12), prohibits an exchange from adopting 
rules that would bar the exchange from listing any stock options class "because that options class was 
listed on another options exchange." Jd. § 240. 19c-5(a)(3). The SEC has declined to prohibit exchanges 
from being a party to exclusive licensing arrangements, the effect of which is to inhibit the listing of 
index options on other exchanges. See Chicago Bd. of Options Exch., Inc. v. lnt' l Sec. Exch., LLC, No. 
06-CH-24798, at 14-1 5 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 8, 2010). This parallel rule would do much to address output 
restrictions and market power. 
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The practical implementation of this proposal is more feasible because of 
last year' s Dodd-Frank Act.296 Dodd-Frank requires the clearing at Derivatives 
Clearing Organizations of many derivatives that were once over-the-counter. 
For the first time, swaps from all over the country will be centralized and 
subject to rules. It would be easy to collect licensing fees from the 
clearinghouse, which could pass the fees on to its users. At the very moment 
that product index economics are most necessary, it has become practically 
possible to collect fees from swap participants using indices like Libor. 
IV. Conclusion 
This Article makes two novel contributions. First, we develop a taxonomy 
and model for understanding fmancial indices. This framework emphasizes the 
irreducible subjectivity built into index production. This subjectivity, which is a 
key component of indices' value to users, also carries the potential for 
manipulation and malproduction. Our model goes on to show that the risks 
inherent in indices are fundamentally related to their type, and any solutions 
must be tailored to an index's taxonomic characteristics. Recognizing that 
many index problems are rooted in a market failure of unstable or uncertain 
property rights, our second major contribution is developing a novel solution 
applicable to a whole range of index problems. Counterintuitively, the best way 
to prevent index manipulation may be through increasing present index 
providers' intellectual property protections. 
296. Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2012, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, §§ 723 , 763(a) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. ). 
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